and was able to go back today. She is good as gold. If she only were a little bit more tolerant! I hate those outbursts of indignation at what are after all my only human weaknesses.

It is wonderful to be a "goy." If you happen to have a mind you can, like Paul Elmer More "sink into silent solitary luxury ...with foot on the fender and pipe in the mouth" and wander off in search of God. But if you are a Jew these days, and are given to thought your mind is more likely to go off in search of man. How is it possible to continue having faith in the human being, when three great nations like the German, the Italian and the Japanese can become so devoid of all justice and pity, and be permitted by the rest of the world to violate with impunity the basic laws of social life and to undermine the peace and security of all the inhabitants of the earth? I would gladly join More in his search of God if he were ready to join me in my search of man. Where do men of his ilk live that they seem so insensitive to the agonies of a tortured people like the Jews, and to the senseless destruction of the millions in China and Spain, and can indulge in the luxury of searching for God?

Using some of More's phraseology I would say: Without God, the universe becomes a mere sorry jest, but without man, or with man as he shows himself today, it becomes "a purulent cancer on the corpse of nonentity."

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Friday, January 6, 1939

Last Wednesday night Dr. Max Schlesinger called. He brought with him the translation of Prof. Bergman's introductory statement to the Magnes Volume, and asked me to go over the English of it. After doing that, I asked him to tell me how the Executive Committee

of the University reached to my letter. He told me that Ussishkin stated that the personal reason I give for my going back to America could not be the only one for my giving up the work here. After some discussion, it was decided to have a committee consisting of Ussishkin, Schocken and Bergman meet me to learn whether there were any other motives that prompted me to take the step besides those stated in the letter.

I am almost through with the lecture I am scheduled to give at Tel Aviv on Sunday, Jan. 15 under the auspices of the (p.237) The lecture is entitled and is an attempt to formulate both a philosophy and a system of education for the General Zionist group here. It is because I find writing for a particular occasion so burdensome, that I want to get it over with as soon as I can. If I am not mistaken, every such task has an upsetting effect on my digestive system, because as soon as I am through with it I usually feel better than I do while I am in the midst of it.

The next piece I have to do is twenty minute talk on the radio under the auspices of the University. I want to take as my theme the need of developing in the community on education consciousness.

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Saturday, January 7, 1939

It is important to stress the difference between a state-nation and a cultural-nation. In a state-nation the source of sanctions for the normative life of its members is the state, i.e. the successive governments who are in political control. In a cultural-nation the source of sanctions is the succession of leaders, teachers and sages whose influence is based not upon force but upon the inherent appeal of what they contribute to the life of the nation.

A very serious problem in Jewish education is presented by the fact that the history of our people from the destruction of the second temple down to the Zionist movement has produced very little that is instructive or inspiring to the average young person. I have heard that from various quarters. What strikes me as even more serious is Goitein's statement in his article in (p.238) that he found that children were repelled by the prophetic demisciations of Israel. If that is true the question is: what shall be given to our children to make them really want to be Jews? We surely do have much that could genuinely be beautiful and inspiring, but unfortunately it exists in a form that prevents it from being either.

There were only six present this morning at the Sabbath discussion which took place at Dushkin's home, Besides Dushkin and myself there were Rieger, Bentwich, Ben-Zeer and E. Simon. Dushkin tried to sum up the substance of my remarks the two previous sessions but I had to remind him of my main point which was that before we can discuss the reconstruction of Judaism, we must be clear in our minds as to what we understand by Judaism and the relation of religion to the other aspects of Judaism. In my remarks I tried to point out that even in medieval Judaism where the philosophic writers speak of "dat" (usually but wrong translated religion) the modern conception of religion is unknown, and what they had in mind was "a civilization." To them Judaism was not a religion, but a supernaturally revealed civilization.

Bentwich reiterated the objections to my approach that he had stated to me before the summer when I almost gave up trying to discuss my views with him. His main contention was that religion was a distinct and separable element in civilization, intended to set forth the absolute truth about God as the Unknowable who exercises

directive influence on our lives. Our problem therefore consists in formulating this truth and fostering it to the best of our ability. Fortunately this time I thought of an excellent analogy that brought the fallacy in his thinking into bold relief. That analogy was suggested to me by something he himself mentions in his article in (p.239) . There he quotes Madame de Stoel as saying that "mathematics can not cultivate the logic needed in practical life, because a mathematical idea is either all false or all true, whereas in life truth and falsehood exist in a combined state." Bentwich himself is especially interested in mathematics. This enabled me to point out that his thinking about religion was vitiated by his mathematical approach which required that the ideas in it be wholly true or wholly false, whereas to my thinking, religion no more exists apart from life than the mathematical aspect of reality can exist apart from reality. Plato discovering the significance of abstract thinking and the value of abstract ideas came to regard them as the essence of reality, and all physical embodiments as detractions from reality. This hypostasis or reification of abstract ideas has given rise to what I designated as "civilized idolatry" in contrast with the "primitive idolatry" of ancient mankind in general. This "civilized idolatry" was later incorporated into Christianity and helped to create the Christian dualism between this-worldliness and other-worldliness. This dualism is a source of moral danger, which we Jews should seek to avert.

E. Simon tried to indicate that he held a middle ground between Bentwich's and mine. He quoted Husserl approvingly in favor of an absolute external truth. But what struck me as peculiar was his conception of the Torah, which he said was also that of Rosenzweig and Buber, namely that the Torah as we have it was not as Maimonides taught, literally dictated by God to Moses, but that at Sinai there

there began the process of translating into words the supernaturally revealed will to Moses and subsequent seers.

On the whole I came away from the session quite upset by two things, first that even the handful of people who have joined it do not take it seriously enough to make a special effort to come and to begin on time, and secondly, that with such a stubborn insistence on supernaturalism or superrationalism as the essential element of religion as manifested by Bentwich and Simon, we shall never be able to arrive at a working basis of any kind.

My Hadassah asked me in one of her letters when she should begin teaching Jeremy Bible stories. In my answer to her I merely said that she better put off telling him those stories as long as possible, so as not to take away his zest for the Bible when he gets to study it at school. But what really should be said about the Bible is that the time to begin teaching it is when you can teach it as consisting of three layers of ideas, one the primitive layer which expressed the thoughts and interests of those who first wrote or spoke them, mainly the latter; secondly the layer which consists of the meanings which the first layer assumed for the compilers and thirdly the layer which consists of what the Rabbis read into the text. Incidentally, writing up such a three layer text of Bible interpretation is a project that holds tremendous fascination for me. I wish I had the time and the energy to undertake it.

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Sunday, January 8, 1939

I did not attend the meeting of the Senate last Wednesday, but I was told that I missed an interesting and heated debate. When I visited Roth yesterday he told me what the debate was about. It had to do with the appointment of a professor in theoretic physics.

The candidates in question are of two types. Two are young men in the middle ~~xxxxxxx~~ thirties -- A. London who teaches at present in Manchester (?) and A. Wigner who teaches at present in Princeton - who are conceded to be geniuses in that branch of science, and a man in middle forties - A. Firt - who though not their equal in originality has been teaching in the Prague University for the last twenty years and has published many excellent works on the subject. According to Roth the question from the standpoint of the University should be who is likely to ~~xxx~~ prove the more successful teacher of the students, and in his opinion - with which I agree - there can be no doubt that Firt is the more suitable candidate. But an issue that is academically irrelevant was introduced into the debate by reason of the fact that the question actually discussed did not turn upon the merits of the candidates but upon the circumstances that both London and Wigner were baptized when they were little more than infants. Now the former has ceased being a Christian and the latter lives as a Jew. It was on that score that the majority voted giving first place in the candidacy to Firt and second place to London and Wigner.

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Friday, January 13, 1939

The major problem in education is how to tame power. In ancient times education was employed in the interests of power. With the appearance of the great thinkers, sages and reformers the notion arose that education should be used as a means of taming power. But with the rise of the State as a veritable god many thinkers have become its priests and are foremost in proclaiming power as the worthiest end of human life.

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Tuesday, January 17, 1939

Last Friday afternoon Lena and I went to Tel-Aviv. We stopped at the San Remo Hotel during our week-end stay. The weather was mellow and we did quite a bit of tramping through the town. I, for one, could not help admiring what our people could accomplish in so short a time, considering the lack of all experience in town building and self-government.

We visited with the Davidowitzs, the Bachs and Joshua Neuman and his family, with whom we had supper on Sunday night. Emanuel Neuman's family was also there. Sunday morning we spent two hours at the art museum. In the evening of that day I gave my talk for which I had come to Tel-Aviv. The talk was given under the auspices of the Tel-Aviv "Friends of the University." It was entitled (p.241) There were about 175 people present. But I knew no one in the audience and they didn't know me, and there was no discussion after I was through with the talk. The person who was supposed to introduce me didn't come on time, so I simply proceeded with the lecture without the formality of an introduction. I can't say that it was a thrilling experience, but I am glad I did my duty.

Now that my thoughts are beginning to turn homewards, various undertakings come to mind, things I should like to work on when I get back. Here are some of them: 1) A revised edition of "Judaism as a Civilization," that would bring it up to date. 2) A systematic presentation of those ethical teachings of the Rabbis that are still valid. This requires going through the Talmudim and Midrashim, the bakkic as well as the aggadic sections. This has to be a cooperative affair. 3) In teaching the course in Religion at the TI I should like to make use of E. Kaufman's 3 vols. of

4) In Humilities I should like the students to read Allfor'ts "Personality."

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Sunday, January 22, 1939

Yesterday morning the discussion group met at Bentwich's. Everyone was present. The discussion was to me more irritating than illuminating. The prospect of our arriving at a common basis for any plan of reforming Judaism seemed further away than ever. I am sorry I read my paper before them on the relation of religion to civilization as conveyed by the term . They misunderstood its point completely. It is useless to try to work together with people who have been conditioned to think in completely different terms. They are too old to submit to re-education. The result is that the entire time is spent in trying to dovetail incommensurate types of thought.

How we Jews will ever acnieve any common ideology is more than I can tell at present, and yet without some common ideology we cannot constitute a functioning group. Neither a common past nor common economic interests are sufficient to weld us into an inherently united people. Are we destined forever to be driven together by the common fate of persecution?

Last night I met the committee consisting of Schocken, Ussishkin and the rector Prof. ~~Krauss~~ Fraenkl that was appointed by the of the University to ask me to withdraw my letter of resignation. We met at Schocken's house. Ussishkin delivered a long speech at me. He wanted me to tell him why it was that the University has not been successful in retaining those who come from America. The late Max Margolis, Louis Ginzberg, Israel Davidson could have been identified with the University. But each

of them preferred to go back to America after having taught here for some time. He quoted what he had said to Edmond Rothschild, when the latter was nearing his eighties: "If instead of giving your millions to Palestine, you would come to settle there, you would be doing much more for Palestine than you are doing now." Likewise, he said that I would be helping Zionism far more by working here than by working for it in America. Apart from the value he attached to my work here, he considered it important for the University to attract men who did not come here because they found it difficult to function elsewhere. So far the majority of those on the staff have come here not as a matter of choice.

What could I say? I tried to rationalize my going back by pointing out that under the difficulties which the pedagogy department labored at present I felt I could make more of a contribution to Jewish life in American than here. This Ussishkin rebutted by saying that whatever work I did here even under difficulties ultimately meant more for Jewish life in America than anything I did there.

Prof. Fraenkel repeated in different words the hope that I would withdraw my resignation. I don't think he was very deeply concerned whether I went or stayed. Schocken on the other hand was really anxious that I should change my mind about going.

Where family spirit is strong, community spirit is weak. If I hadn't felt responsible for sending $60 monthly to my folks, and Lena and I hadn't been so attached to our children and kinfolk, we might have made a go of it here. Even then the problem of personal security would have to be taken into account. In case the Arabs kick up, or there is war, or England plays the Jews dirty -- and it is very likely that all the three things are liable to happen - what then?

Probably at no time in human history has there been such challenge to faith or to the feeling that there is some meaning to human life, as there is today. The effect of the Lisbon disaster in the 18th century on thinking men and women was slight compared to that of the present inhumanity of man to his fellow such as practiced in countries like Germany, Italy and Japan and to some extent also in Russia. As I see it now, it is futile to try to restore that faith by means of Aristotelian teleological cosmology, or Aquinas' synthesis of revelation and Aristotelian or Hegelian dialectic. Kant was right after all in looking to man himself and not to the universe outside him for the basis of faith. But he was wrong in believing that such faith is an act of intellectual willing. It seems to me that unless we can identify some basis for faith within accessible experience of the average person life is bound to lose all worth and meaning. The fact is that before a person can have faith in human life as a whole he must first have faith in himself. We put the cart before the horse if we want to find reason for faith in mankind before we have cultivated any genuine ground for faith in ourselves. The problem of faith can be met only if we go about it the other way round. If upon looking into our own souls we become aware of something in us which, if universalized, would render life as a whole worthwhile, then we cannot be mistaken. The only thing of which that can be true is love and good will. If we can discover in ourselves evidences of love and good will, we are bound not only to have faith in ourselves, but in humankind as a whole. The reason for this should not be hard to understand. We cannot help concluding that there must be many others in whom there is this quality of love and good will. Once we become aware of that fact we have a veritable sheet anchor for faith. If that quality is more or less inherent in human nature, it willultimately assert

assert itself. That a long time will pass before that will happen does not alter the fact of its presence and slow but sure predominance. That fact should be sufficient to render life significant and worthwhile. However, this conclusion can be arrived at only if we ourselves possess sufficient love and good will to have faith in ourselves. This is not a matter of abstract belief, but of practical demonstration. The more love and good will we practice the more natural it is for us to feel that other human beings are likewise endowed with those qualities which,were circumstances favorable, would find outward expression. This experience is bound to restore any flagging faith in the worthwhileness of human life. The solution of the problem of faith lies therefore in the domain of deedd of love and good will.

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Thursday, January 26, 1939

Yesterday afternoon I went to see Schocken, as we had arranged, and he showed me the text of the letter he intended to send to Adler in reference to the possibility of my coming once every two years for the summer semester.

In the course of the conversation about the status of Jews in America as compared with what was the status of the Jews in Germany, he said he had been reading considerably about the attitude of the German Jews toward German culture and politics and he found that beginning with Bornes, Jews who were prominent in letters and politics always said and did things to irritate the natives. Bornes' criticism of Goethe was the subject of some critic in the 60's who made it the occasion for an anti-semitic attack on Jews. Lasalle's sensational oppostión to Bismarck did the Jews no good. The Jews in England, said Schocken, are making the same mistake, and he mentioned Sachar, Brodetsky and Laski who are identified

with the Laborites, as pursuing the same tactics. For one who professes to have come ut for Zionism when it was highly unfashionable in Germany, this policy which would have the Jew refrain from voicing his honest opinion about the life and thought of the country in which he lives, seems rather incongruous. But after all he is a rich man, and economic interests outweigh his Zionist sympathies.

Last night Dr. J. Rivlin came to see me to get my opinion of Barukh J. Berkowitz's manuscript (p. 244)
which I had with me for some time. I told him that although it contained much that was not worthy of publication, most of it was, provided some one undertook to edit it.

This afternoon a committee consisting of this same Berkowitz, Miss Affachiner, Rabbis Uno and Grunwald (of Vienna) came to ask me that I intercede with Miss Szold to get her to allot funds for the work of an Orthodox group that was interested in trying out Berkowitz's plan of a with about 100 children. I told them frankly that while I approved having his manuscript published, I could not give my approval to experimenting on those children a plan which required highly trained pedagogues and considerable resources. I could see xx point in trying to train a group of children who came from Orthodox homes in a spirit of Orthodoxy and I could see xx point in experimenting with children along the lines laid down by Berkowitz, but not in the combination of the two, least of all with Berkowitz himself as the leading spirit. He impressed me as anything but a practical pedagogue.

I should like to write a book on "The Meaning of Democracy," containing the following chapters: 1. Democracy in Politics; 2...in Economics; 4...in Culture; 5...in Ethics; 6...in Religion.

* * *

Saturday night, January 28, 1939

New excitement in camp. I received yesterday a most flattering invitation from Prof. Eustace A. Haydon of Chicago University in the name of the Haskell Foundation to deliver a series of six lectures on"Modern Trends in Judaism" during the coming summer. They promised to pay $1500 for the lectures and manuscript which will be published by the Chicago University Press. "It seems altogether fitting at this time to give Judaism special attention," he adds. The letter having been sent orginally to the Seminary was readdressed here together with a supplementary note saying, "Don't you think that this would be a good way to welcome you back to America? Please cable your decision to me at my expense."

The moment I received that invitation my mind began to work on the subject of the lectures. I can see already that the new task will divide my energies and prevent me from concentrating on the problem of general education, its history and principles. But this is my fate, and I dare not complain, because I am lucky indeed to have such an extraordinary opportunity as that offered me by this invitation to get a hearing among non-Jews for my conception of the present status of Judaism.

All day yesterday I was trying to work out a radio talk which I am scheduled to give here toward the end of February. The subject I was working on was "Why Education Must be a Problem of Public Concern." Somehow the subject proved more difficult than I had thought, and I was unable to make very much progress with it. After I received the above invitation, I was unable to go on thinking on that subject, because all my thoughts kept on reverting to the Haskell series of lectures. As a result, I am ow working on an idea which grew out of my new interest. It is "What the Yishub Owes the Diaspora" (p. 245)

Sunday, January 29, 1939

There has been no let up in the terrorist campaign of violence. The last few weeks not a single day has past without shootings, woundings and killings in and about Jerusalem. Last Tuesday at 2:15 in the afternoon a Jewish taxi-driver was shot in front of Magnes' home. I've heard that the University staff have urged him to move out of the section near Herod's Gate, where has been living these few years, and that he informed them that he had decided to do so of his own accord. A strange man, this Magnes, with an unusual dose of saintliness and courage in an environment so abounding in courage that it takes his courage for granted, and so lacking in saintliness that it has nothing but contempt for his saintliness.

Last night a bomb was thrown on Ben-Yehudah street near the Onion Theatre. Six Jews and one British soldier were wounded.

Since Thursday, Jan. 19 I have begun to take lessons twice a week in learning to read music at sight. My teacher is Mrs. Berlin who had been recommended by our neighbor Mrs. Feigenbaum whose children take music lessons from her.

When the movement to have everybody read two chapters of the Bible was inaugurated here a little over a month ago by the

(p.245)

I was rather skeptical of its value. As a result of repeated allusions to the practice of spreading I could not endure the idea of my remaining an outsider. I was consequently swept into the practice and I have been doing my daily chore. The reading began with Isaiah but I came in after Jeremiah was begun. Today's reading is Jer. IX-X.

What impressed me most was the fact that in the kibbutzim the practice of Bible reading is spreading. I was told yesterday by Mrs. Zuckerman that at Aim-Harod where the workers eat supper in two shifts, one at 7:00 and the other at 8:00 before supper was served to each shift the two chapters of the day were read, while everybody listened patiently.

And now for the talk I have to give on the radio.

The story of David at Ziklag is illustrative of the attitude which is often taken by those at the front toward those who for some reason are compelled to remain behind. Thus those whom choice or circumstances have placed in Palestine, the front line of Israel's struggle for existence, refuse to share with those who remain behind what they achieve in terms of Jewish values, of self-confidence and hope of a Jewish future. They are all too apt to look upon the Jews of the Diaspora as laggards who have no share in the God of Israel. This is what one might infer from 1) the attitude of blame or contempt toward those who accept their fate as destined to remain in Diaspora; 2) the sweeping assumption that Judaism in the Diaspora must disappear, and 3) the complete absence in the educational content of the schools to indicate any intent in or responsibility for Jewish life outside Palestine.

1) The attitude of blame or contempt is, in the light of the principle formulated in the early days of our history to the effect that "As is the share of the fighting man etc." both unJewish and unethical. It expresses a "holier than thou" spirit, which is condemned by Jewish sentiments as may be gathered from the rabbinical comment of (p.246) . But what is worse is that it is unwarranted. It is questionable whether there are very many whose virtue is not born of necessity. This is not said to minimize the worth of

such virtue, for there are altogether too many for whom necessity is also the mother of vices. But even they who excel in virtue owe much of their excellence to externally impelling factors. If the failure of the emancipation had not opened the eyes of our foremost leaders to the absurdity of our remaining a homeless people, we would not have been where we are. But this failure of emancipation, even in their case, had to be an immediate and irrefutable experience. It was the unbroken policy of Russian autocracy to render life impossible for the Jews that produced the auto-emancipation, and the outbreak of reaction in France in the Dreyfus case that motivated the Jewish State. Although there is considerable anti Semitism in the democratic countries where millions of our people have found an asylum, it is extraneous to the very essence of the institutions and traditions of the political life of those countries. They should not be mentioned in the same breath with the countries in which anti-Semitism is an integral part of their institutions and history and where it has always formed part of governmental policy. If Jews put their trust in such democracy they may, God forbid, prove to be wrong, but they should not be condemned as laggards or traitors. It is well to apply the principle of not judging your neighbor until you are placed in his situation.

2) As for the sweeping assumption that Judaism in the Diaspora must disappear, that too is one of those generalizations which may sound logical, but which may prove as wrong as all such "logical" generalizations about the fate of the Jews. I am not saying merely that the fact that Jews have existed all these centuries proves that they are indestructible. But what I maintain is that in all such generalizations certain factors are apparently overlooked, otherwise the Jews should have long ago disappeared. More than one modern social scientist has been maddened by the refusal of the Jews

to verify his theory about their inevitable disappearance which should have taken place long ago. The factor which, I believe, is overlooked when the future of the Jewish people is under discussion is history. The consciousness of the past as a conserving influence in the life of Israel is so obvious a fact that its full significance is seldom realized. Its formative power in uniting the various tribes who had a common past in Egypt and in the Desert and making a nation of them is evident to any one who reads the Bible. It functioned in enabling the Jews to build out of the ruins of the first commonwealth a second one which endured over half a millenium. It kept the Jewish people alive for eighteen centuries despite loss of state and dispersion in various lands where they were the victims of hatred and persecution with but rare intervals of respite. It is by dint of this same consciousness of the past that we lay claim to Palestine as our homeland, and are giving new life to the language and culture which existed for centuries in a state of suspended animation. There can be no mistake about the very tangible results which this awareness of the past is capable of producing. Yet being a unicum, since in the life of no other people has that awareness exerted any considerable influence, it is not taken into account by those who deal in sociological generalizations. That is the factor which is usually overlooked by them in their prognostications of the Jewish future.

May not the same awareness of the past which makes it possible for Israel to lay claim to hits homeland, and throw all national precedents to the wind, do something unprecedented for the Jews in the diaspora and keep them alive in spite of the tendency of landless minorities to disappear? Formerly this awareness of the past expressed itself in terms of supernatural revelation or religion. It may survive in that form in the minds of many Jews. But in the minds of many more it will undoubtedly evolve the form of expression

which is in keeping with the humanist spiritual thinking of the day. They will either not want to suppress it, or they will not be able to suppress it without creating disagreeable complexes. (According to Jung, I believe, collective consciousness operates subconsciously in every human being. But that is quite a different thing from a collective consciousness operating consciously, as in the case of the Jews.) Hence by the same token that the consciousness of the past is giving rise to the reclamation of Eretz Yisrael it may also enable the Jewish people to adjust itself in the democratic countries of the world -- which let us hope all countries will in time become -- as an international people.

3) But, and here is where diaspora Jewry needs most the Jewry of Palestine, that power of the awareness of the past as a factor in conserving Jewish life in the modern world will make itself felt in diaspora Jewry provided Palestine Jewry regard itself not as the whole of Israel but only as a sector, even if the most alive and vital. Incalculable is the demoralizing effect upon diaspora Jewry of the assumption on the part of the Yishub that the only value of former is in what it does to further the upbuilding of the land, but that it has nothing which is of intrinsic Jewish worth. How is Palestine ever to achieve that proper relationship toward the rest of Jewry which would give the latter the feeling that it has a long lease on life and is destined to play a significant role in the concert of the nations? We cannot state at the present time just what Palestine's contribution should be toward enabling the Jewish past to function in the life of diapsora Jewry, but we can state the prerequisites to Palestine's making such a contribution. They are two:

a) In the first place, the Jewish child in Palestine must be brought up with a sense of attachment to, and responsibility for, not only Palestine Jewry but world Jewry. There is altogether too

little attention paid in the subject matter taught here to the intrinsic unity of world Jewry and to the need of integrating the child not only in Palestine Jewry, but in the Jewry of the world. The child here should be made acquainted with the task that confronts diaspora Jewry in its effort to survive. He should realize the meaning of hyphenate loyalty and the difficulty of living in two civilizations, but he should be given to understand that this does not necessarily lead to assimilation, but on the contrary may evolve a new constellation of important social and spiritual values for mankind as a whole.

b) Secondly, there is one institution which more than any other will be expected by diaspora Jewry to weld into a living unity the Jewries of the diapsora with the Jewry of Palestine, and that is the Hebrew University. Basically a creation of diaspora Jewry, in addition to all that it has done to make possible the upbuilding of the land, the University represents diaspora Jewry's implementation of its appeal to Palestine Jewry to foster the spiritual and ethnic unity of Israel the world over. Diaspora Jewry in making it possible for its great scholars and teachers to come here and give of their best to Jewish and general learning expect that they will formulate the values and ideals which will confer new purpose, dignity and worth to Jewish life everywhere. It is they who should evolve the formula for a renewed Israel as an international people with its central sector in Palestine, a people whose loyalty to the countries in which they live would not only not be questioned, but highly cherished. No hyperbole but literal fact is expressed in the hope that the University may serve for world Jewry a function analogous to that which the Temple did in the past, the function of defining to the world the nature of the bond which unites Jews throughout the world, a bond not of political or economic interests, nor of ambition for power, but one arising

out of the common wish to realize God's kingdom on earth. This function the University will be able to fulfil, provided the Jews of Palestine will want it and enable it to do so.

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Monday, January 39, 1939

It seems to me that the yearning for individual immortality is an individualization of the feeling of oneness with the herd to which one belongs. It is an attempt to compensate for the loss of that self-identification with the group which enables the individual to transcend himself or the limitations of his own bodily existence, the limitations both in space and in time. The process of individualization naturally begins with the leaders. They are therefore the ones to feel first the loss of that instinctive self-identification which is common to the rest of the human herd or group. Accordingly they are the first who are singled out for immortality. As the solidarity of the human group begins to break up and individualization progresses, there are more and more candidates for immortality. It is then that religion takes the form of otherworldliness.

In course of time, however, the untenability of individual immortality becomes too apparent. As a result the attempt is made to restore by artificial means the sense of identity with the group which had disintegrated with the process of individualization. It is then that we witness a new eruption of nationalism. With Judaism and Christianity losing their force as other worldly religions, i.e. as means of assuring immortality to the individual, their adherents find it necessary to resort to national patriotism to satisfy the need for self-transcendence in time and space. And so we find Ahad Ha-am fifty years ago urging the Jews to achieve a passion for nationhood and in our day the exaltation of national patriotism to spiritual hegemony.

While it is difficult to draw the line between the conscious and unconscious in the various manifestations of life, it is possible to makr off distinct stages in the development of consciounsess. Thus in the human race as awhole and in the individual human being as such we cannot help discussing a different stage of consciousness evolving when the primitive races achieve civilization or when the child enters on his fourth or fifth year when conscious memory begins to operate. From the standpoint of stages in consciousness there can be no question that with the advent of Greek science and philosophy, mankind entered upon a new stage of consciousness. What is not generally recognized, however, is hat the last two or three centuries represent a further stage of consciousness than that of Greek science and philosophy. With the rise of the historical psychological and social sciences man learns to view the achievements of the stage of consciousness rppresented by Greek science and philosophy in the light of the various factors that operated at the time that consciousness evolved. Likewise all ideas are no longer viewed as absolute and independent but in relation to their setting. No longer are they viewed as static x but as dynamic and as functions of continually chainging and developing situations. In other words we have really reached the stage of consciousness which is as much more complex than the one of Greek ~~xikm~~ science and philosophy as the relativity view of the physical universe is more complex than the Newtonian view.

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Tuesday, January 31, 1939

I was not altogether pleased with the way my lecture came off yesterday at the University. I don't think I succeeded in interesting the students sufficiently, because I read too much from the notes instead of driving home the main points by speaking ex-

temporaneously as I have learned of late. I was therefore especially anxious that today's three hour session in the "Principles" should come off better. But as luck would have it, the subject of the paper for today "Some Obstacles in the Way of Progressive Education," was one on which I had not yet developed any specially impelling idea, and the paper itself was very poor. I finally did come upon some integrating idea, but I wasn't sure I would be able to do much with it. Nevertheless, the session turned out to be one of the most successful during the entire time I have been teaching here.

But now comes the interesting thing. Almost invariably every time I leave the University satisfied with myself for having done a good job, I come upon something that is frightfully upsetting. It is usually in the form of news which the taxi driver conveys to me about someone having been wounded or killed a short while before. When the taxi passes either the Hadassah Hospital or the Bekur Cholim Hospital or King George Road, we encounter a crowd and the taxi-driver stops for further information about what has happened. Last week, for example, I learned in that way about the taxi-driver that was killed in front of Magnes' home. Now today there was a variation on that kind of upsetting experience. This time, as is usual on Tuesdays, I had Prof. Yellin and Klein in the car with me. We no sooner neared the New Hadassah Hospital grounds than I saw a large bon fire in front of the new building and our car veered suddenly into the hospital roadway on the right and as it did so I heard a shot. There I saw several ~~xxxx~~ ghaffirs with their guns and some workmen. The faces of the two gaffirs and of one of the workmen were covered with blood. When I asked what happened they seemed dazed and didn't know what struck them. In the meantime I saw one of the gaffirs run with his gun into the field on the other side of the high road and kneel ready to shoot. Not hearing any further shots I told the taxi-man to drive

on to the city. His theory is, which I think is correct, that the shots came from remains of explosives mx that came in contact with the bonfire. But for the time being the temporary mood of satisfaction was cut short.

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Wednesday, February 1, 1939

While I was at the Faculty meeting this afternoon I happened to see a copy of the "Davar." From there I learned at at 10 this morning a Jew had been killed in Talbich about 500 feet from where I live. He was selling coffee to Jewish customers he had in these parts and was set upon by a couple of Arabs who shot him dead on the spot. Alex Dushkin afterwards told me that Julia was holding a meeting in her house when she heard the shots. As they went out to see what happened they saw the Arabs running. A few steps from the house they found the victim breathing his last.

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Thursday, February 2, 1939

Mrs. Grunwald (a sister of Israel Brodie, an active Zionist formerly of Baltimore and now of New York) told me that her father-in-law Dr. Max Grunwald formerly of Vienna wanted me to lend him a copy of my "Judaism as a Civilization." Thinking perhaps he really wanted to read "The Meaning of God," I thought I would take over to him a copy of the Hebrew translation of The Meaning of God, and in that way get to know the man. I spent a pleasant hour and a quarter with him, due mainly to the fact that I spoke Hebrew more fluently than he did, and that I tried to make him see the light. He is certainly a man of parts and a scholar especially in folklore and yet his understanding of the present is worse than elementary; it is all awry.

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Saturday, February 4, 1939

I believe that I have hit upon a fundamental idea in seeing the problem of Europeanism and of Judaism as revolving around the conflict between church and state. To follow the development of this conflict it is esssntial to hold clearly in mind the nature of these two institutions. The state consists of those leaders in the group who maintain social order by virtue of their superior strength and knowledge of practical affairs. The church consists of those leaders who maintain social order by virtue of their ability to reckon with the invisible beings or forces whose existence is most vividly apprehended by them. In ancient times every clan, tribe or nation had these two grups, viz state and church. Usually the state would have the upper hand. In that case the church was a department of the state. Occasionally the reverse arrangement obtained as e.g. in ancient Egypt. Among the Jews during the second commonwealth the quarrel between the Sadducees and the Pharisees was essentially as to whether the church should be a department of the state or the state a department of the church. The Pharisees who maintained the latter view finally won for the simple reason that when the state was destroyed the church was the only one left to maintain social order.

The status of the Jews, accordingly, during the centuries following destruction of the commonwealth was that of a people governed by its church, but hopefully praying for the reestablishment of its state. The West European people throughout that time were passing through conflicts of all kinds which centered about the church state relationship. At one time it looked as if the Catholic Church would succeed in establishing its hegemony and reduce the states to departments of itself helping to maintain social order by means of physical sanctions. But the states on the other hand insisted upon treating the church as a department whose function it was to help

maintain the social order by means of spiritual sanctions. During this entire period the Jews constituted a rival church to the one with which the state in the various European countries tried to come to terms. They were treated (and mistreated) as an alien corporate body who could have no portion in the state.

The separation of the church from the state meant that a radical difference washenceforth to exist between those two institutions. Whereas formerly submission to the authority of the two institutions was obligatory on every individual in the nation, from that time on submission to the authority only of the state was obligatory, whereas the church could only receive voluntary submission. Under this new arrangement Jews could become identified with the state on the same terms as non-Jews provided they surrendered their aspirations to attain a state of their own. This the French Synhedrion did and their policy was later accepted by the sponsors of the Reformist movement in Germany and America.

The fact that is usually overlooked when we consider the separation of the church from state is that it involves two things, 1) a negation of the right of those who represent invisible beings or forces to exercise authority other than moral, and 2) a radical change in the conception of the state. Instead of representing merely superior strength and knowledge of practical affairs, the state must simultaneously represent superior moral authority. In order, however, that it shall not abuse its authority and itself become a church or apotheosized into an earthly deity two safeguards are necessary: one is democracy, i.e. the existence of an opposition party to the one in power, and the recognition of it as part of the state or government. The other is the existence of voluntary churches that are independent of party or state.

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Wednesday, February 8, 1939

As I was going to the lecture room yesterday I met Dr. Ben David, the Secretary of the University Senate, and he told me that I should be prepared for disturbance of the lecture, because the Revisionists ordered a strike in protest against the opening of the London conference on the Palestine question, which was to take place yesterday. Fortunately there was no such disturbance in my class. I learned, however, that Alex Dushkin had some tussle with a few who tried to stop his lecture.

If I were ever tempted to discover any traits in our people that pointed to moral superiority over other peoples, the presence of such savages among us as the Revisionists would put all such thoughts out of my mind. To me they are as depressing a sample of humanity as the followers of Hitler and Mufti.

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Saturday night, February 11, 1939

The (p.253) (the name that J. Bentwich gave the group that has been meeting lately every other Sabbath morning) finally got to a point in its discussions last Sabbath where we had to decide what turn the subsequent discussions should take. The three alternatives were 1) concrete questions of religious practice, 2) social and ethical problems, 3) theological, like the meaning of olam ha-ba etc. The majority preferred the first. Bentwich then said he would get Alon to open the discussion with a summary of what the Sabbath meant in the past and on the basis of that to suggest what is to be done with it now. Fearing that we were going to listen to a lot of the old stuff that would get us nowhere, I suggested to Bentwich that he tell Alon to omit the summary of traditional law concerning the Sabbath and to come to the point by indicating where we might draw the line between that phase of the Sabbath which might come under the category of (p.253) and

that phase which belonged to the category of . Bentwich replied that he was sure Alon wouldn't attempt such a thing and that I was the logical person to do it. He therefore insisted that I should start the discussion of the Sabbath at the next meeting. So I have to interrupt my other work for a while and formulate some ideas on the Sabbath.

A procedure to be avoided in arriving at a working conception of Sabbath observance for our day is that of allowing the new life needs to determine what reforms are to be introduced and then juggling the traditional law till we find a basis in it for those reforms. We only delude ourselves when we think we conserve the traditional law that way and we at the same time evade the need of formulating a rational principle for such changes as we advocate. The proper prerequisite therefore is to recognize the inherent character of the traditional laws and the agency entrusted with its enforcement and to determine in the light of the fundamental reinterpretation given above (pp. 224 ff) of Judaism as a whole what character Sabbath laws must assume for our day and what agency or agencies must be entrusted with their enforcement or general observance.

The first step in the advocacy of any reform measures is a clear apprehension of the fact that the sanction for the traditional Sabbath laws was their supernatural origin. It was that sanction which was regarded as making the Sabbath holy and its observance a means to the sanctification of life in the individual and in society. Only those who subscribed to that sanction and in its spirit mastered the legislation of the Torah including that which bore on the Sabbath, were qualified to interpret that legislation. Ther interpretation carried the same weight as the written laws themselves and was binding upon all generations of interpreters. In them alone was vested the

right of enforcement of the laws in general, and Sabbath laws in particular. This entire conception implies that the proper social organization of the Jewish people is that of an ecclesia with the authority of interpretation of the law and its enforcement vested in an ecclesiastic body.

In contrast with this traditional conception of Jewish law is to be the one in keeping with the modern outlook on life. The sanction for the validity of Jewish laws is not to be their supernatural origin, but their capacity to make for the worthwhileness or holiness of life. It is assumed of course that they make for general welfare. But in the light of what we have found to be the desirable attfibute of norm of an adequate civilization (224 ff), its laws must possess the additional power of rendering life significant in the deepest sense. Only those traditional laws that possess this efficacy can continue to function. The Sabbath institution as such has been recognized as possessing that potency to a high degree. Hence there can be no question as to its continuance in modern Jewish life. But what is true of the Sabbath in general is not true of all the particular laws associated with its observance in the past. Hence the need of setting up specific principles that should guide us in drawing up the general lines of future Sabbath legislation.

For that purpose it is necessary to take up the problem of what should constitute the agency to legislate or interpret Jewish law which is not to be based any longer on a supernatural sanction but on the sanction arrived from the efficacy of that law to render life significant and holy, as significance and holiness are viewed by a modern minded person. That agency cannot any longer be an ecclesiastic body or individual, but one which derives its authority from the present generation whose interests are to be served. Only a democratic state can therefore constitute such an agency.

At this point it is necessary to prevent a conclusion which is commonly drawn whenever it is suggested that ecclesiastic authority be superseded by state authority, namely that a religious social order is made to give way to a secular social order. This conclusion is based upon the unwarranted assumptions that only that which is supernatural is the proper subject-matter of religion, and that the pursuit of holiness does not fall within the scope of the natural and the human. Once we outgrow these fallacies, we shall discontinue dividing human interests into secular and holy and give up the notion of a feasible division of labor on the basis of that distinction. If we can consistently keep in mind the truth that the very significance and holiness of life demand the avoidance of any such dualism as that between the secular and the holy, we shall finally put an end to that hasty and mischief producing compromise implied in the New Testament dictum of "Give unto Caesar, etc."

On the other hand we cannot advocate the assumption of such wide powers by the state as to give it complete control over the lives of the citizens and to dictate to them to the last detail what they may or may not do and what they must do in order to achieve a life of holiness. It is just at this point that we must reckon with one of the fundamental ideas of the modern man, namely, that we cannot experience the wortnwhileness or holiness of life, unless we are accorded a large measure of personal spontaneity and freedom. If we take the Sabbath itself as an instance, any attempt to further its observance by enforcing detailed laws as to what must or must not be done on the Sabbath day is certain to deprive it of its efficacy as a factor for genuine holiness.

The solution must lie, therefore, in dividing the function of rendering various laws and institutions as a means to life's holiness between he state and other agencies that differ from the state

in not having the authority to compel obedience. Such agencies would necessarily have to be voluntary. As to the division of the function itself, the primaiple would have to be somewhat along the following lines: The state should be concerned chiefly with removing the obstacles to the experiencing of life as worthwhile or holy. It should accordingly engage in removing all causes of disease, poverty and unsocial conduct. As for those practices which are intended to accentuate directly and immediately the significant and holy aspects of life, the state's function should be to prevent their being interfered with. That should be the furthest it should have the right to go in encouraging their maintenance. But the positive aspect to them, their form and content should be supplied by voluntary groups or left to the individual.

The Sabbath furnishes an excellent example of how this principle of division of labor between the state and voluntary organizations may be applied. The state should enforce the observance of the negative aspect of the Sabbath by prohibiting all manner of work in fields, factories and places of business which constitutes gainful occupation and permit only such work to be done as is essential to the health of the community, or to the avoidance of extensive waste. Provision, however, should be made that those engaged in such work on the Sabbath should at least have every other Sabbath free. The principle underlying such enforcement of the Sabbath is that only a general cessation of work for one day a week can enable the citizenry to cultivate the higher interests of life and evoke its highest values.

On the other hand, it should be the function of volunteer groups to evolve the content of affirmative meaning and value to be integrated with the Sabbath. Some groups which would still retain the traditional approach, in whole or in part, would naturally want to add further prohibitions to those imposed by the state. But a

group which deliberately approached the Sabbath in the spirit of freedom would do wisely in not adding to the prohibitions imposed by the state, but confine itself to devising ways of beautifying the Sabbath and rendering it holy by means of positive ordinances. It would formulate meaningful ceremonies for the Sabbath eve at home and concentrate on an instructive and inspirational service on the Sabbath morning, and not meddle with any of the questions of what work the individual may or may not do. We assume that the state has seen to it that no one engage in gainful occupations. It is needless to add that the traditional approach to the matter of Sabbath observance in a juridical spirit, finding loopholes for leniences if possible and resorting to legal fictions, but above all drawing distinctions between the permitted and the prohibited on the basis of chance expression in the Sabbath laws, is entirely out of place in this approach. The main concern should be the establishment of a Sabbath day that is heartily accepted because of the way its observance is conducive to the health, happiness and holiness of the masses of the people.

An important corollary to be drawn from this conception of Sabbath observance is of particular significance for the diaspora. Without entering into a lengthy description of the decadence of the Sabbath in the diaspora and of the resulting disintegration of Jewish life, it is apparent that nothing is so vital to diaspora Jewry as a functioning Sabbath. So long as Jews will insist on regarding what is at present considered as the seventh day as the only one on which the Sabbath may be observed, there is no possibility of the Sabbath observance being reinstated, or of Jewish life having even a fighting chance for survival. The only way out of the present impasse is to have the Jews arbitrarily accept as the seventh day the day when the rest of the population observes as its Sabbath. To insist at the present time, when Jews are dependent for their eco-

nomic existence upon the rest of the community, upon observing the Sabbath on a different day from the rest of the population, and to allow ancient theological controversies to determine our present conduct, is only another way of cutting our noses to spite our face. It was all very well in pre-modern times, when the order of days was regarded as cosmically fixed and supernaturally determined. But all that has gone with the wind. On the other hand, modern mankind has come to realize how arbitrary calendars and time arrangements are. It should therefore not require any too violent a wrench to postpone the seventh day to Sunday.

But the incentive to take such a step will have to come from Palestine Jewry. Only a movement in that direction originated in Palestine would possess the necessary authority and encouragement which would prevent the postponement of the seventh day from being regarded as a surrender to Christianity.

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Monday, February 13, 1939

In my lecture today I began to discuss the history of education in ancient Israel. In developing the point about the Ark having served as "symbol" of Yahweh's presence, a few of the Orthodox students objected to my presentation of the subject. One fellow in particular ~~xkx~~ pestered me quite a bit after the lecture. I had a somewhat similar experience last year at the same point in my lecture.

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Wednesday, February 15, 1939

Yesterday I received a circular letter from the (p.258)

of the University which had been addressed to other members of the Faculty and to a few outsiders, saying that the Student's Organization was very much troubled by the problem "? "

and that they turned to us for an answer. It was their intention to publish the answers. At first I was inclined to treat the letter as imposing another superfluous task. But when I met Prof. Baer in the bus on the way to the University, he told me that he considered it important to work out an answer. This influenced me to give thought once again to the problem of nationalism. The following are some of the ideas I want to develop:

It is impossible to discuss the subject of nationalism without defining clearly the sense in which we use the principal terms around which the discussion centers. Nationalism will signify in this discussion the recognition of national consciousness as a fact which operates in the minds of human beings just as does ego consciousness or family consciousness, communal consciousness or any other form of social consciousness, and the advocacy of it as a factor for the best interests of the individual in whom it inheres and of the group which is its object. The group which is object is to be designated in this discussion as the nation which should be distinguished from what should be designated as a compound-nation, but which generally also goes by the term nation though wrongly so. The British people consisting of English, Scotch and Welsh nation is a compounded nation. Likewise the Swiss, and so was Austria before the war. But Poland was a nation at that time although it was then parcelled out among the three compound nations of Russia, Austria and Germany. Before the Emancipation the Jews were a nation though they had been exiled from their land and scattered among many other nations. The problem which I wish to deal with is: To what extent if any is nationalism warranted in maintaining that national consciousness should be fostered? Or, what are the conditions under which national consciousness operates, and when does it operate in such a way as to warrant the high claims made for it by nationalism?

National consciousness is the awareness which an individual has of being a member of a group that is known both by its own members and by outsiders as a nation. Neither those within nor those without, as a rule, give much thought to the question what makes the group into a nation. Those within are satisfied with the we-feeling which they have with regard to all who belong to the nation, a we-feeling that is larger in scope than the we-feeling of family, clan or tribe, and yet definitely excludes others who have a like feeling about their own nation. Everyone wants to be a member of some nation and deems it a catastrophe to be denationalized.

In the past there was no attempt made to differentiate between the we-feeling of national consciousness and the we-feeling of family consciousness. Like the latter, so the former was regarded as one to ?(p.259) kinship.

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Thursday, February 16, 1939

What differentiates the we-feeling that expresses itself as national consciousness from the we-feeling that expresses itself in other types of collective consciousness? That differentia should be sought mainly in the type of factors that contribute to national consciousness. Moreover it should be one which would account for all kinds of nations both ancient and modern. They are: a common tradition of language, history, laws, customs, folkways, plus an active leadership which is concerned in translating that tradition into a means of serving the essential needs of all who are identified with the nation.

Among the earliest evidences of recognition of language as a mark of nationhood is the story of the tower of Babel. It is also implied in the use of tongues as a synonym for nations in Is. 66,18. There is very evident reason for differences of language constituting

a factor of division among human beings, since those who speak the same language understand one another and can cooperate, whereas the failure to understand precludes cooperation. A common language is therefore conducive to the we-feeling, whereas a different language makes one conscious of the otherness of those who speak it. Insofar as different language groups arose through no meditated purpose, nations which, to begin with, are the product of such differences are the outcome of unconscious forces working in human life, forces not inherent in human beings themselves but in the chance circumstances in which they found themselves. I use advisedly the past tense, because it may be that such chance circumstances no longer exist, due to the virtual elimination of frontier from this earth. Among such unconscious forces should be accounted all ancient conquests which resulted in nations being eliminated and others in being enlarged. Not until Alexander the Great do we hear of any conqueror being interested in spreading the language and culture of his people. He was therefore the first to inaugurate the deliberate effort to tamper with the process of nation making and nation changing.

In the fact that the variety of languages is the primary factor in the division of mankind into nations we have the very important implication that nationality and national consciousness are not the product of any hereditary tendencies or instincts but of historical circumstances whose effects constitute a social heritage which is transmitted through the process of education both unconscious and conscious. As such, nationality cannot derive from the type of urge which in its own justification, as is the case with hereditary instincts e.g. those which make for the family, or any of the individual instincts. On the other hand the very fact of its not being due to hereditary instinct is likely to place it among the distinctively human values, which if actually realized should constitute the justification of which it

stands in need. But before proceeding with the problem of its justification which is the main occasion for this discussion we must know much more about its various factors and its manifestations in the past.

It is apparent that language brings in its train a whole complex of elements that go into the making of nationhood (make similar correction in subsequent passages where reference is not to group but to relationship) since all language refers to content of human experience and the objects of social intercourse. From the standpoint of its role as a factor in the making of nationality, the elements which it brings into play are the remembrance of past heroes and events, or history, the customs which include rules both negative and affirmative to which every member of the nation is expected to conform, laws which regulate conflicts of interests and help to maintain the peace and folkways which besides accepted modes of behavior under various circumstances not subject to such strict sanctions, customs and laws, also includes characteristic forms of esthetic self-expression. Hence it is not the mere fact of a common language enabling people to carry on social intercourse that renders it an influence for nationality as that it serves as a medium for other factors which give content and meaning to that social intercourse. How important they are becomes evident when we view them by themselves.

Just as language enlarges the scope of one's social relationships in space beyond the confines of family, so it enlarges it in time beyond one's contemporaries. It functions as a medium of narratives and myths, the heroes and events of which serve as a bond of unity that is stronger than present interests, because their character as belonging to the past proves their power to endure as such a bond. That is something which contemporaneous events still have to demonstrate. By helping the individual to transcend the immediacy of the group life which he shares, the traditions concerning past heroes and events make

it possible for him to contemplate the group as a whole existing indefinitely and surviving the individuals of whom it is constituted. This contemplation has undoubtedly been attended by all sorts of fanciful notions, but the fact remains that it brings into the foreground of consciousness the group as a whole in a manner which no amount of involvement in the contemporary interests common to the group could possibly achieve. There can be no nation or national consciousness without some kind of history or outstanding past events and heroes as points of reference in the social intercourse made possible by a common language. Among primitive peoples the initiation ceremonies of the adolescent youth were the occasion for communicating to them in

dramatic and highly emotionalized fashion the deeds of the ancestors, whereby the group of which they now became conscious members had been launched into the world. This initiation was conceived as conferring on them a second birth, that is birth into a super-personal life. Not only did the new-born individual feel that the range of his own experiences was enlarged, but that it included henceforth experiences which gave him as it were a share in the power and the greatness of his ancestors. The sense of personal enhancement which resulted from this self-identification with the past of his people naturally acted as an incentive to deeds on his own part worthy of such a past.

More contemplative awareness of one's nation is not sufficient. The nation must be felt as a living presence in the course of one's daily routine, if national consciousness is to be more than an occasional falreup of pride in the achievements of one's nation in the past. The nation must exert a constant pressure on the individual. That it does through its customs and laws; hence their part in keeping national consciousness alive. It is of their very essence to interfere with the self-fulfilment of the impulses, and to set up, even at best,

enough of inner conflict to erouse consciousness of a not-self that prohibits and commands that rewards obedience and punishes disobedience. This not-self is not merely the person or persons in authority, since whatever authority or power to compel obedience resides in them does not derive from their own will but from the fact that they are regarded as embodying and expressing the will of the nation. Nor is that will purely arbitrary and bent upon subordinating the impulses of the individual as an end in itself. No matter how unreasonable those customs and laws may seem to an outsider, to those within the nation they express the will to cooperation in the interests of the general good. And just because they tend to call forth a degree of inner conflict, they help to bring into relief the aspect of cooperation as an active and ever present bond among those who constitute the nation.

The sense of nationhood or national consciousness is furthermore augmented by a whole series of folkways and folk symbols and memorials which deserve to be placed in a category apart from laws and customs. Unlike the latter which are the main inhibitive or attended by fear of punishment if not conformed to folkways and folk symbols are affirmative and spontaneous expressions of national life, which afford the individual the opportunity of giving expression to the large resources of surplus energy for which he has not outlet in his routine activities. Temples, public worship, processions, dramatic performances, dance, music and song, statues, pyramids, etc. all have always been associated in some way with the life of the nation. This aspect of nationhood is the one that calls forth the most pleasurable experiences in the life of the individual. To those who possess an extra portion of energy and talent, folkways and folk symbols have become a means of creative self-expression, whic. evokes high regard and admiration from one's fellows. To those who are not so

gifted they provide occasions for passive enjoyment. Consequently they are more instrumental perhaps than any of the other elements of national life in endearing the nation to the individual.

The foregoing are the elements of the culture, civilization or tradition which constitute the content of national consciousness or we-feeling. It is unnecessary to point out that in their actual functioning these elements are integrally related to and presuprose one another. But it is necessary to indicate the one factor which is essential to their very existence, and that is a land. There is a good deal of misunderstanding with regard to the relation of land to nationality (nationhood) as there is in all matters in which there is implicated a factor that is absolutely indispensable, and yet not at all an integral part of their essence. In defining the essence of a tree, for example, we must distinguish between the elements that constitute it, such as the roots, stem, etc. and the conditions indispensable to its existence such as earth air and sunshine. The same is true of a nation. Language, history etc constitute its very being. But land is not part of its being, although it is a sine qua non. It is inconceivable that a common language should arise among people who live in different parts of the world, or that they should have a history in common unless they or their ancestors occupied at one time a particular territory upon which that history was enacted. If not the axquisition of the land certainly the need of defending it against invaders and the fortunes attendant upon the struggles waged in its behalf furnish the main theme of a nation's history. Likewise every part of it in which those struggles were waged and as a consequence memorialized in song and story gives a realness to the nation as a living entity that is made such and kept such by the land which is its home.

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Saturday, February 18, 1939

What has thus far been said about the elements which constitute the national culture does not account yet for the living process of nationhood. There are dead cultures or civilizations. What renders them alive? The answer is: leadership which relates them actively to the present day interests and problems of the people, to their educ a-tion, to their economic needs, to their inner and outer conflicts and their diversions. This leadership has been historically of two types: one type is expert in dealing with factors and forces of a visible and tangible character, the other type is expert in dealing with factors and forces of an invisible and intangible type. Those acts of peace and war in which there is a visible relation between means and ends come under the control of the type of leadership designated as state. The means used in turn by the State to carry out its ends ultimately also come down to those of a visible character viz: physical force. The phase of those same arts of peace and war in which there is no visible relation between means and ends is controlled by the type of leadership known as the church. The variety of the factors and forces with which this latter type of leadership has occasion to deal is of incomparably far wider range than that with which the former has to deal. There is comparatively little difference between the kind of physical force employed by the rulers who constitute the State in a primitive people and that employed by a modern state in order to achieve its ends. It is otherwise with the church. There is a universe apart between totem, tabu and magin on the one hand and cosmic divinity and personal ethics on the other. Though threats may figure in the means of control employed by the church as in those employed by the state, the element of persuasion is always present, and comes to occupy almost the whole of the method employed by the church. This becomes evident when we realize that the state must always remain a

compulsory institution whereas the church ultimately evolves into a voluntary institution.

While in all nations these two types of leadership have always existed since human beings naturally distinguish between the visible and the invisible factors of life, not all nations have followed the same pattern. In most cases the state leadership predominates and subordinates the church leadership as a department of the state. In fewer cases the reverse is the case. In ancient Greece and Rome as the Byzantine Empire before modern times and in modern Protestant States where the Lutheran or Episcopalian Church is the State church the church is a department of the State. It is the case also in Shintoism. It was the case in Israel during the period of the first Temple. During the Second Temple the reverse was the case until the rise of the Hasmonean dynasty and the Saducees. The Pharisees inaugurated a new movement to render the church leadership supreme. With the destruction of the second temple their purpose was achieved, and throughout Jewish life thereafter church leadership has been predominant, though there has never been a want of a kind of fragmented and quasi-state leadership. It had to be fragmented because the Jews were exiled from their land and each community had to have local quasi-state leadership. This analysis should end once and for all the interminable discussions as to whether the Jews in the diaspora have been a nation or a church. The very way in which the issue is put confuses the entire matter. The alternative to a church is not a nation but a state. There can be no question whether the Jews have been a nation throughout the centuries of exile. They were a nation in exile. They knew themselves and were known by the rest of the world as such. The question is whether the leadership of the Jewish nation was predominantly of the church type or the state type. And the only answer can be: of the church type. Though the other type was not altogether wanting, it was subordinate to the church type.

A probable reason for the confusion of the issue by making the nation the alternative to the church is the anomaly of Western Christianity or the Catholic Church. When Rome fell in 473 the situation was such as to favor the tendency of the church assuming the dominant leadership and using the state as a department subordinate to it. As the barbarian peoples coalesced gradually into distinct peoples with state leadership of their own, there was for a time a protracted quarrel between the Catholic church and these rising states as to which should have the upper hand. This is known as the Guelph-Ghelline quarrel. The real meaning of these events which is usually missed, is that when the barberions conquered Rome and they began to evolve the elements of a common culture based on that of ancient Rome the Catholic church wanted to make of them one nation with itself as the dominant leadership. That plan failed. Hence the Catholic church in the final outcome remained a spiritual leadership without a nation but with a following held together by individual acceptance of its authority, a condition not much different from that of the modern Protestant churches. The fact that the Jews were without a state has created the illusion that the Jews ceased to be a nation and became a church like the churches of western Christianity. What really happened was that in the Jewish nation the church leadership alone continued to function as a unit, whereas the state leadership was fragmented and reduced to a subordinate position.

The upshot of the foregoing analysis that the Jews until the end of the 18th century were a nation in the truest sense of the term because they fulfilled the two conditions of nationhood viz: they possessed a common culture and a leadership that translated that culture into present meaning. Although they were exiled from the land in which that culture took its rise, the fact that that land remained for the Jews a frame of reference throughout their exile was more than

sufficient to counteract the denationalizing tendency of exile. And although they lacked a unitary state, they had a unitary church that functioned very effectively in their education, administration of justice and the social life.

Thus far I have treated the subject of nationhood merely from the descriptive point of view. I have tried to define its essence as an existential fact. I shall now take up the normative or ethical aspect of nationhood. That is the aspect implied in nationalism, which is a philosophy or tendency that stresses the need of fostering nationality and national consciousness. The normative aspect becomes an object of consideration when there arises the need for making a choice between alternatives in which nationality is involved. We must therefore know which choice is in question, before we can state our attitude toward nationalism. There are three possible choices, viz: 1) a choice between nationalism which recognizes a priority of obligation to the members of one's nationality and cosmopolitanism which recognizes no such priority would have one treat all human beings as equally entitled to whatever consideration duty or love impels. 2) A second choice is between nationalism which insists on one's nation being sovereign and autorchic and recognizing no higher law than its own will and needs, and internationalism which, admitting a high degree of autonomy to each nation, advocates the submission of each nation to a sovereignty higher than its own and representative of a group of nations but preferably of all nations. 3) A third choice is between nationalism which insists upon a member of a nation remaining loyal to the nation into which he was born despite all odds and the moral right to surrender such membership and become a member of another nation. In order to determine the moral issue involved in making any of the foregoing choices, we have to fall back upon what we have found to be the essence of nationality and the content of national consciousness.

The first moral choice is, in terms of what we have found to be the nature of national consciousness, a question whether the we-feeling which human beings naturally entertain with reference to those with whom they have in common the elements of nationhood, namely language, history, laws and folkways should be regarded not only as normal but as normative and involve a greater intimacy and sense of responsibility on their part than is involved in the case of those with whom we do not possess any of these elements in common, or is this differentiation or partiality morally wrong or undesirable. The answers which naturally suggests itself is that ethics has generally approved the preferential treatment of the members of one's own family. Ancient man always saw the nation merely as an extension of the family bond. Historically this may well be questioned. But from an ethical point of view it should be regarded as an advantage that man naturally regards the bonds which are the product of mental and spiritual factors on the same plane of intensity as physiological factors. As a matter of fact the issue of nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism flared up only among a few rationalist thinkers in the 18th and 19th centures, but never really attained any serious proportions. It is generally taken for granted nowadays that other things being equal a person owes the members of his nation more interest, cooperation and love than those who are of a different nation.

Sunday, February 19, 1939

With human nature being what it is, cosmppolitanism lends itself readily rather as an excuse for not doing one's duty by one's own nation than as a stimulus to active participation in the welfare of other nations. The nationalism which deprecates cosmopolitanism has proved itself morally justified.

A more serious question at the present time is presented by the second type of nationalism which sees a danger to a nation not only in cosmopolitanism but in internationalism. According to this type of nationalism a nation should seek to be self-sufficient economically and morally. Any tendencies or movements within the nation which transcend the boundaries of national life are a menace and should be suppressed. This applies in the first place to economic affairs as a whole and to economic reforms in particular. A nation should realize that it is regarded as a competitor and potential enemy by all other nations and it must therefore do all in its power to render itself secure against them. Any measure that renders it dependent on other nations or imply cooperation with individuals of other nations not sanctioned by the state is bound to prove a source of weakness Hence even moral and religious movements, to say nothing of economic movements or pacifist activities, that aim at general human and international welfare are, in the light of this type of nationalism, entirely unwelcome. But it would go further and insist upon each one regarding his nation as not only unique but as superior to all other nations, as fulfilling more adequately the meaning of humanity than any other nation. One's nation must be regarded as divinely chosen, as enjoying a greater share of the divine spirit than any other. Its language must be regarded as the most beautiful, its laws as the most sacred, its history as the one most divinely guided, its morals as the most just and its folkways as the most humanizing. "My nation can do no wrong," must be the motto for each citizen. Whatever adventures it enters upon to extend its dominion or to improve its will on others are a manifestation of its superior energy and will and a means of bringing other peoples within the circle of its bliss. It is not hard to recognize in all this the type of nationalism preached by Chauvim and now emphatically avowed by Germany, Italy and Japan.

Merely to state what this type of nationalism means is to make evident its immoral character to those who take for granted that a doctrine which implies that any one group of human beings is alone entitled to the distinction of humanity, whereas all other groups represent lower types of humanity cannot be considered moral. What then shall we make of our own tradition which apparently conforms to this type of nationalism, in that it would have the Jew regard his people as divinely chosen, its Torah or civilization the most perfect and only those who become proselyted and accept its authority as eligible for the life of bliss in the hereafter? To be sure there are stray passages in rabbinic literature which sound a universal note, and it is possible to offset R. Judah ha-Levi's conception of Israel as being as much superior to the rest of mankind as the latter is to the animal world, with Maimonides' contention that all human beings are eligible to eternal life. But the main burden of Jewish tradition is undoubtedly inclined to be strongly nationalistic, in the sense of this second type of nationalism.

If we mean to be consistent in our condemnation of this kind of nationalism, the only possible reply to the charge that such is the nationalism taught by Jewish tradition is: In the first place for the very reason that we would have every national tradition subject to the laws of universal reason and morality, we find it necessary to reject as obsolete the kind of nationalism taught by our tradition. Secondly in justice to tradition we must realize the circumstances which led to its teaching that kind of nationalistic doctrine. Both of these considerations point to the conception of Jewish tradition not as something fixed and eternal, but as subject to modification in response to growth in the knowledge of reality and the wisdom of life. With the world constituted as it was in the past, with all nations regarding one another as mortal enemies engaged in a deadly struggle for

existence with each knowing very little of the inner life of the other this kind of nationalism seemed to have been the only kind that gave a nation a chance to survive. Neither Plato nor Aristotle despite their extraordinary moral insight and intellectual grasp achieved the idea of universalism. The very idea of an evolving Jewish tradition is but part of the more general idea of that our moral conceptions also keep on evolving. What is deemed immoral/now may have been perfectly moral in the past.

But in the specific case of the nationalistic doctrine taught by Jewish tradition, there are very definite extenuating circumstances which must be taken into account. The struggle for existence waged by the Jewish people since the destruction of the Second Temple called for a far greater measure of inner reenforcement than that waged by other nations. Only an extraordinary faith in its own worth and destiny could arm it against a cruelly hostile world bent upon ~~xxxxxxx~~ destroying it. And the only way our ancestors could keep such faith alive was by promulgating that conception of Israel which we find in rabbinic literature and which we border so closely on the nationalism we deem objectionable. To realize to what extent this kind of nationalistic teaching was a defense mechanism called forth by the predicament in which Jews found themselves afrer they lost their state, we need only compare the attitude of the Prophets, when prophecy was in its prime. How little that attitude chimes in with rabbinic teaching is evident from the way the rabbis condemn it.

Actually, however, the most serious aspect of nationalism, which affects us Jews at the present time, is the one which is the alternative to the moral right to transfer one's allegiance from one nation to another. It became a very urgent problem the moment Jews were offered civic rights. Dohm expressed the belief that it was possible and advisable for Jews to retain their communal autonomy.

But he stands out in that respect practically alone. The more general stand was that so sharply defined by Napoleon when he convened the Sanhedrin for the purposes of answering the question whether Jews were ready to surrender all claims of nationhood and become xxx completely integrated with the nation which was ready to confer upon them civic rights. The compromise arrived at by the French Sanhedrin, and later reaffirmed and developed by the Reformist movement is in the light of the above analysis of the meaning of a church entirely untenable. Such compromise must logically lead to complete assimilation. Is assimilation as the complete transfer of allegiance from the Jewish nation to a non-Jewish nation ethical?

There was a time when the transfer of national allegiance was regarded as an act of moral turpitude under all circumstances. A propos of what was said before about changes in moral standard, the change in attitude toward the surrender of citizenship in one nation and becoming a citizen of another is a typical illustration. Since the beginning of the 19th century there has prevailed the attitude which sees nothing wrong in the transfer of national allegiance. With one very important exception, however. When the nation to which one belongs is attacked, then it is regarded as an act of treason to try to escape one's responsibilities to it, by becoming a citizen of another nation. The assumption, of course, is that the nation which is endangered has some kind of leadership which is putting up genuine resistance. Otherwise there is no nation to which one owes anything.

These considerations indicate, in the first place, why it is wrong for the assimilationist to avail himself of the tolerance toward the transfer of allegiance. The Jews are very much in the position of a people that is attacked. It is attacked in that only some nations have emancipated the Jews and not all, and nowadays many have rescinded whatever emancipation they had previously granted. Moreover so long

as the alternative to accepting emancipation is the status of rightless alienage, the existence of the Jewish people is threatened. Under those circumstances it cannot be moral for a Jew to abandon his people. Such an act is usually characterized as cowardice, opportunism or treason, depending upon the spirit in which it is carried out.

Secondly, we gather from these considerations the condition that must be fulfilled within the nation itself before one has a right to condemn assimilation as immoral, and that is there must be an active leadership within the Jewish nation that makes a serious effort to utilize the Jewish tradition, culture or civilization as a factor in helping or inspiring the Jew to cope with the actual difficulties in his situation. Until the end of the 18th century the rabbinate constituted an adequate leadership and was able to keep the Jewish nation alive. Since then as a consequence of the Jews' having been catapulted into a strange world, new adjustments of all kinds had to be made, intellectual, social, political. Then the want of a new type of leadership made itself felt. The historical school of Jewish thought helped to formulate a modern presentation of the Jewish past. They were stimulated mainly by the desire to further Jewish emancipation. Though there was little correlation between means and ends, the fact that the "science of Jewish learning" was related to present needs entitled its creators to be accounted as Jewish leaders who helped to vitalize the Jewish tradition by showing its implications for our day. Their epigones, however, have lost themselves in arid wastes of dry-as-dust scholarship which offers an escape from the vital problems of Jewish life. Zionism has supplied leadership of another type, the type which deals with the visible realities of mass migration, homeland and a place in the sun. Had it not been for the spiritual leadership of the founders of Jewish learning and for the practical leadership of the founders of Zionism there would today have been no Jewish nation. But their work

must now be continued with renewed energy and with renewed vision, else the assimilationist will have a good excuse for cutting loose from the Jewish people.

The main task which confronts Jewish leadership today is to define anew the meaning of nationality (or nationhood) and national conscience, in terms that will not only render tenable, but will invest with purpose and dignity the status of the Jews who must indefinitely remain scattered among the various nations of the world. They must point the way to a conception of Jewish nationhood that would make it compatible with unquestioned loyalty to whatever non-Jewish nation they cast their lot with. This task involves a spiritual insight into the potentialities for good that inhere in nationhood, and the practical wisdom to translate those potentialities into a way of life not only for Jews, but also for the rest of the world. It would be nothing less than poetic justice if the Jewish people which more than any other has supplied the inner forces that have made of nationhood a potent influence in shaping history, an influence unfortunately at present most viciously abused, should also contribute toward the elimination from nationhood its dross of collective selfishness and sacred egoism and render it essentially a means of social creativity and individual betterment.

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Monday, February 20, 1939

Individually I am as well off as one has a right to expect to be, but as a Jew I am experiencing mental tortures of hell as on the one hand I read of the insanely sadistic attacks of the anti-Semites and on the other hand I learn of the fanaticism and stupidity of some of our own people. A reprint from an article by Joshua Starr in "Jewish Social Studies" (I,1, 1939) on "Italy's Anti-Semitics" brought home to me the fact that rattlesnakes are angels compared to creatures

like Pregisi, Interlandi, Farinacci and the rest of that whole damned crew. The papers presented by students for the seminar tomorrow, in which they deal with the subject of religion made me sick at the thought of what addled brains we have among our teachers and rabbis. Nor was I much edified by the stories Prof. Torczyner told me this afternoon about the stone-throwing campaign led by Rabbis Amiel and Uziel in Tel Aviv at automobiles driven by Jews on the Sabbath, and their success in having an educational group cancel their invitation to him to lecture on the Bible, because of his scientific approach to its study. If at least I myself commanded a facile pen and a power of eloquence to combat human stupidity I might have been able to fight off the spiritual depression under which I labor. But when I realize my shortcomings, when I see, for example, how dull and heavy footed is the argument on nationalism in the preceding pages, especially in the beginning, I just am too discouraged to hope for better things.

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Tuesday, February 21, 1939

I am beginning to see more clearly than ever the true character of the concerted Fascist attack on the Jews. When I first read in "A False Utopia," by M. H. Chamberlin that Fascism needs for propaganda purposes some enemy whom it has to identify as the chief menace to the world, in the same way as Communism with its philosophy of class struggle finds it necessary to make a scarecrow out of the bourgeois class, and that it holds up the Jews as that kind of menace, just as the Communists in Russia center their attack on the Kulaks -- when I came across that remark I thought that it was journalese. After having read Starr's article on "Italy's Anti-Semites," I realize that the Fascists are very definitely building up an analogous case to that of the Communists. Whereas the latter who are the protagonists of the proletarians are interested in crystallizing all who are antagonistic to proletarian

dictatorship into the capitalist class, so the fascists whose purpose it is to establish the dictatorship of the middle class are interested in representing the plutocrat and the proletarians as the common enemy. In order to effect such an apparently impossible union, they use the Jews who happen to have a sprinkling of plutocrats and a sprinkling of outstanding leaders in Russian communism to symbolize as the common enemy.

It is strange that after having translated the greater part of Dewey-Horn's "The Democratic Philosophy of Education," and having taught it last year its real significance is first dawning on me. I think Dewey's book would have had a far greater vogue, if he had brought out that significance more clearly. The thesis of the book, that education should aim at the growth of the educand and at the democratization of society, would have stood out more sharply if Dewey had developed the antithesis which his book seeks to negate. That antithesis is the traditional conception of education for the many as the inculcation of obedience to society and its traditions, and for the few, as a training in leadership or domination. A summary of the history of education from this point of view would have livened up the book. After that he could have pointed out that most of the modern versions of education are essentially the traditional conception in modern garb, especially the idealistic versions. Certainly Herbart's version of education merely supplies the traditional conception with a powerful instrument -- his methodology.

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Saturday night, February 25, 1939

It would be worthwhile for some one to collect the various circumlocutions used by our modern Jewish historians and theologians to describe the theophany at Sinai. That ought to make a curious but

revealing collection which would demonstrate the cowardly attitude of our so-called leaders, who have failed our people on the most crucial matters pertaining to the problem of readjustment in their thought and life.

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Monday, February 27, 1939

Days of dread are again on us. The British Government, to win the support of the Arab world in the coming greater World War, is repudiating the Balfour Declaration. God knows what's in store for us here and abroad.

Human relationships between individuals and groups are governed by two kinds of forces, visible and invisible. Visible forces are those which are embodied in human beings insofar as they possess physical strength and in all manner of physical implements which augment that strength to a degree far beyond that which resides in the human body. Invisible forces are those which operate without any visible agency. This category has an infinitely wider range than the former. It includes mana, gods, spirits at one end and moral influences like love, justice and reason on the other end. These two sets of forces seldom if ever operate separately. This is why it is so difficult to give a correct picture of all that is involved in any situation in which human relationships are implicated. Keeping this unavoidable difficulty in mind, we have to treat any situation in which visible forces are mainly in control as one in which power dominates, and any situation in which invisible forces are in control as spiritual. This necessity of teating the two sets of forces as if they existed apart from each other is reflected in the existence of two types of government which have been present in all human societies, namely state and church. Even the City of God had to have some kind of militia, and even a Fascist State has to have its department of propaganda.

The Jews are a group with a distinct individuality which exists as a sum of cultural habits in the minds of its individuals and in their relations to ~~each~~ one another. This individuality thus belongs essentially to the invisble forces. So long as they possessed a land of their own they possessed visible forces as well, which counted as factors in their relations to each other and in their relation to other groups. With no land of their own they have had to rely mainly on the invisible forces, especially so in their relation to the outside world. In their mutual relations they possessed some kind of visible force. Hence the Kahal.

A very important principle which we must keep in mind in studying the relations of groups to each other is that in their mutual conflicts and adjustments the forces which are employed on both sides take on the same character. It is not liekly that a people using bows and arrows will hold out long against a people using gun powder. The more potent weapon will become common to both. The same is true of invisible forces. The more potent form or formula or conception employed by the one side is necessarily adopted by the other. Heine did not realize the far reachiming implications of his joke about Jews making of their Judaism what Christians make of their Christianity. The fact is that such is the inevitable law of all group relationships insofar as they make use of invisible forces. The gods and categorical imperatives become common to the contending groups. The trends in contemporary Judaism are a demonstration of this principle.

Traditional Judaism represents the version given by the Jewish people to the invisible forces prevalent in the pre-modern world. Those invisible forces were all viewed as belonging to God the creator of the world having created man for His glory etc. It was comparatively easy for Jews to identify the invisible forces on which they were to rely. The modern world however is itself confused as to the nature of the

invisible forces -- whether they are supernatural or humanist. Hence the corresponding multiplicity of versions given to them by Jews in their desire to maintain Jewish individuality.

But the worst of it is that recently there has come to the fore nationalism which is based mainly on the predominance of visible force. To this the Jews have responded with a nationalism of their own which was based on the "minority rights" type of nationalism, and which thus belongs to the invisible forces. Lacking land they could not rely on actual visible force of any kind even less so than the minority peoples identified with specific territories. Hence the struggle to make up for this lack by various ideologies which represent appeals to invisible force. The fact is that if visible force will extend its domain Jews have little chance of surviving. The only hope is that invisible forces will ~~xxkxn~~ again come to prevail. If the world will be made safe for democracy which may be defined as the beginning of invisible forces conceived in modern fashion, Judaism will survive.

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Tuesday, February 28, 1929

Again everybody is under great tension. The dastardly Arabs found it necessary to celebrate their victory by killing three Jews in Haifa and committing other acts of violence. And the Jews retaliated in wholesale fashion after months of self-restraint, during which time not a day passed without some Jews being murdered. A bomb was exploded in Haifa killing 27 Arabs and wounding 34.

In the class today the discussion dealt with the subject of "Religion - traditional and modern". The student Kugler was the protagonist of Orthodoxy. The two points that I was led to stress as a result of the discussion were: 1) On the basis of the assumption that the human mind is incapable of knowing the true nature of reality and that there

must therefore be for the mind the great domain of the unknowable, Orthodoxy argues that we ought to accept without further question the teaching that the Torah was supernaturally revealed, as a mystery beyond the power of human comprehension. This is sheer sophistry. 2) From an educational standpoint Orthodoxy is spreading mischief by maintaining that only the traditional conception of the origin of the Torah is entitled to be called Judaism and that Jews who refuse to subscribe to that conception are sinners. What it is doing is analogous to the Marxist teaching of class struggle and to the indication of the belief that all the bourgeois are bloodsuckers. The former, like the latter, is incompatible with democracy.

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Saturday, March 4, 1939

Whatever one may think of Reformist and Conservative Judaism, one must admit that they have made a positive contribution to Jewish and general culture in that they have fostered Jüdische Wissenschaft. All that neo-Orthodoxy has contributed is vicious polemics.

The problem of dividng the functions of social control between State and Church is relatively simple as long as religion confines itself either to supernatural or sacramental matters. But the moment religion wishes to identify itself with ethical standards and interpretations, it has to pass judgment on the way the State performs its tasks. This necessarily brings the Church which ventures to cultivate that type of religion into conflict with the State. Hence the deliberate effort of totalitarian states to confine religion to supernatural and sacramental functions.

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Wednesday, March 8, 1939

There are four different conceptions of nationhood: 1) the racial, 2) the theological, 3) the political and 4) the cultural. The Jews in defining their nationhood vis a vis Christendom which claims to have become heir of "Israel" upholds it on racial-theological grounds. In the past Judah Ha-Levi in his contention against both Christendom and Islam; in modern times Steinheim, Rosenzweig, Buber. Believing as I do that it is more important to reckon with the modern political conception of nationhood, I think it is more to the point to counter that conception with the cultural one. This is what I mean to imply by designating Judaism as a civilization.

The racial conception of nationhood which has been revived by the Nazis is based on the assumption that blood-kinship is the supreme factor of human life; the theological attaches supreme importance to the God-consciousness; the political to power; and the cultural to civilization.

In reality all the four above named factors play a significant role in the making of nationhood. The problem is: which factors should be treated merely as existential and which as normative. Here again is where we differ along the lines indicated before. Here again is where the cultural approach shows to advantage. It alone, of all the four, points to what may be regarded as the normative conception of nationhood. The other three make for international bitterness and war. They are unamenable to reason. On the other hand, it is the cultural approach alone that is translatable into the analggy of the orchestra of nations and that is compatible with the supremacy of reason.

The theological approach treats the history of the world as the history of God and of human salvation.

The chief point in the application of the conception of Jewish nationalism to education should be the following: In education it is unwholesome to inculcate in the children the notion that the Jews belong to a unique category of human beings or that the Jewish nation possesses racial or ideological characteristics that justify its being regarded as divinely chosen. This is especially dangerous to children of a minority group. When in the past the Jews said they were a chosen people they affirmed what the overwhelming majority of other peoples claimed concerning themselves. In other words they utilized a generally accepted category and applied to their own status. The principle illustrated in the interpretation that the Jews give to their nationhood is that they tend to utilize whatever prevailing category they regard as valid to identify their own status. It was in this spirit that Josephine tried to represent the Jews as a philosophic sect, and in modern times Jewish thinkers adopt whatever social or philosophical category they happen to regard as true or authoritative.

I came a little while ago from the meeting at Magnes.' Buber and Magnes read the statements they have worked out in answer to Ghandi's recent statement about the Jews in Germany and in Palestine. Buber's statement was worked out very carefully and effectively. Magnes' on the other hand was very weak and shamefully apologetic. Among those present were Benjamin, Bergman, Sholem, Baer, Koebner, Gutterman, Miss Szold, Schlesinger and quite a few others.

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Thursday, March 9, 1939

The session at Magnes' home last night had a depressing effect on me. In the first place, that a man of Ghandi's reputation and influence should have permitted himself to advise Jews in their present tragic plight to inviolate themselves -- this is what his message

amounted to -- and to charge them at the same time with being usurpers in that they try to recover their homeland, without as much as an attempt to hear the Jewish side of the case, helped to weaken my faith in human goodness, the only faith left me these days. It is all too apparent that he allowed himself to be influenced by the politicians in his entourage who are interested - as are the British - in courting Mohammedan good will. Secondly, the allusions to Jewish suffering, past and present, in both Buber's and Magnes' statements, and the sad pass to which we have come to that we have to be continually fingering our wounds and exposing our miserable lot to no purpose whatever. The mischief Ghandi's article set on foot is potent, far reaching and enduring. What chance have any replies to it to make any impression? And finally the self-degradation to which we submit for fear of hurting the feelings of one who so shamefully wrongs us as to condemn us without even giving us a hearing. I was especially disgusted by the tone and contents of Magnes' letter. It was most unmanfully apologetic and most childishly put together.

I have the time of my life formulating the part of the chapter on Traditional Judaism in which I want to make the point that the basic fact of Traditional Judaism was that it made possible a highly effective type of Jewish self-government. Even though that self-government was not centralized in a State, it was dominated by a single code of Law which exercised a more integrating influence nationally than a State. Having no one with whom to talk the idea over, I shall try the challenge presented by this Journal.

In speaking of a single Code of Law, I have reference, of course to the Talmud. (Incidentally I must say that while I still deplore the many shortcomings of the Talmud, my recent thinking on the subject of Traditional Judaism has augmented my respect for it.) In actuality,

the characterization of the Talmud as a Code does not do it justice. It is a code only in the sense that no law in Jewish life could be regarded as authoritative, unless one could find support for that law in the Talmud. This does not mean, however, that one could go to it for guidance as one goes to a systematized code. The Common Law with its cases and decisions as a source of precedent for authoritative decisions comes nearer in spirit to what the Talmud meant as a source of authority in Jewish law. The odd thing is that the Talmud includes the Midrash, which comes very near being a code of law, in the usual sense of the term except for the fact that in many instances it records differing opinions with regard to the law. But were any one to ignore the Gemara in passing upon a moot question he would be almost as mistaken as if he based his decision upon the text of the Torah. The very manner in which the Talmud arose conditioned its subsequent character as a dynamic factor for Jewish self-government. For five centuries it existed as an oral tradition which grew in scope of application and in definiteness of ruling as a result of its having served the triple function of basis for academic learning for legal debate and for legislative discussion. The great "Yeshibot" in Palestine and Babylonia where the oral tradition was evolved and organized were not merely academies of learning. They were also Supreme Courts where litigation were tried and legislatures where new ordinances were enacted. Qualified students participated in the debates preparatory to the rendering of the decision or the pronouncement of the ordinance and the other students listened and learned. Both academy and law court were the gainers through this mutual integration. The former beheld its theory translated into practice, the latter benefited by having its practice illumined by theory.

When the Talmudic tradition was written down, it became the source of codes, some of which as in the case of Alfasia's and Maimonides' were apparently intended to save the scholar the trouble of having to go

through the discussions recorded in the Talmud, and to supply him with the final authoritative law. But the reason the Talmud was not superseded by these codes that grew out of it is that it contained the reasoning on the basis of which decisions were rendered, opinions voiced and laws enacted. This enabled the Talmudic tradition to function as educational material, thereby making it possible for the academy and the law court to retain their original mutual integration. It prevented the law courts from becoming esoteric affairs. In the case of a people with a centralized State, which can compel obedience to the decisions of the courts, the courts can afford to ignore the general interest of the people. Not so in the case of the Jews who had no central state. If the people were to yield obedience to the decision of the courts, it could only be because they were convinced of the authoritative character of those courts. This could come about only through the exercise of the educational function with which the principal courts were identified. The educational function was the connecting link between the people and the courts. To the academy of learning any one who was mentally qualified was eligible. Through it there was transmitted the validity of the religious sanctions upon which those who rendered the decisions, or enacted the ordinances had in the last resort to defend in order to give effect to their pronouncements. Thus it was the unique synthesis of education and the juridical function that made possible a type of local self-government that could dispense with a centralized state.

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Monday, March 13, 1939

Traditional Judaism consisted of the following elements: 1) self-government, which was made possible through the existence of civil law, of men trained in it and of a system of courts and above all through the political set up of ancient society which necessitated the corporate status of Jews; 2) a world outlook and an ethical attitude based on

supernaturalism and other-worldliness and on hopes for this world of a messianic and millenial character, and 3) an elaborate system of ritual observances and prohibitions which were regarded as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of divine favor.

Modern Judaism is broken up into various trends which stress only one or the other of the foregoing elements. National Judaism stresses the first, Reformist Judaism the second and neo-Orthodox Judaism the third.

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Thursday, March 16, 1939

Another Hitlerian earth-quake. The Nazis have annexed Czecho-Slovakia. What next? People here are storing food. For once the Bible seems to have a message that is to the point. It is this: (p.278)

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Saturday night, March 18, 1939

Last night I heard Chamerlain's speech over the radio which he delivered at Birmingham Town Hall. To me it seemed to say that we are on the brink of war. Had Nazi nightmares in my sleep.

The met this morning at Rieger's. Alon gave the second part of his long-winded but well organized talk on the historical aspect of the traditional Sabbath laws. For the second time I took along with me my statement on the modern observance of the Sabbath but did not get a chance to read it. I am really glad I didn't read it, because it is so radically at variance with the mood generated by the historical approach to the Sabbath that it would have sounded bizarre to those present and would have fallen flat. And that in spite of the fact that all the time Alon was discussing the minutiae of the Sabbath laws, Bentwich was taking notes.

I have had to suspend for a while my work on "Modern Trends" etc and to begin preparing for the lecture I am scheduled to give under the auspices of the local "Friends of the University" on "What is the Ideology of Democracy?" This has led me to read "Political Pluralism" by Kung Chusan Hsiao which I am finding to be both informative and stimulating and lucid. In the course of reading it I was led to formulate the following definition of the Church, as distinct from the modernist protestant conception of it as a volunteer adult education group. The Church, historically understood is the agency that governs a nation or group of nations by dint of its alleged power or skill to deal with the invisble forces that govern society.

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Monday, March 20, 1939

In spite of the big headline in yesterday's Palestine Post which read "World Tension Intensified" I managed to make some progress with the subject I am working on, namely the democratic ideology. I had read most of Hsiao's Political Pluralism and found it very informative and stimulating. But like most of those books, it only helps define the problem of democracy a little bit more clearly and nothing more. I shall have to get better acquainted with Laski's writings. After Hsiao's analysis of Laski's main ideas, I do not expect to find any real solution there. A long time ago I read Laski on the church and state problem. From what I recall he doesn't seem to have gotten very far with the disentanglement of that either. As I can see now, Laski is not strong on the ethnological development of the church state controversy. For that reason he really fails to grasp what is back of that controversy.

I believe I have come upon a promising solution of the problem of pluralism by discovering that the crux of it is to be found not in the question of the state vs. all other corporations with the church as one of them, but rather in that of the church vs. all other corporations with the state as one of them. In other words, it is the growing spirit

of democracy that is mainly responsible for the state church controversy, because it is democracy that gives a naturalistic and ethical significance to the invisible forces which govern society. Hitherto the upholders of democracy have maintained that only when the invisible forces are conceived in supernatural fashion is there reason for their being represented by a special agency of government, i.e. a church, but that with the identification of these forces as human and ethical there is no need for their having such an agency . This assumption constitutes the main weakness of democracy as it has thus far been realized. Fascism, especially the Nazist phase of it, has taken advantage of this weakness and has placed the agency representing the invisible forces -- national patriotism and imperialism, with the nation as the deity -- in control of the state i.e. of all the corporations which represent the material interests and fighting strength of the people. The only salvation of democracy lies in realizing that no people can exist without an organized agency in control of its spiritual forces. What it must do, therefore, is to identify those spiritual forces as the antitheses of fascist jingoism, namely as reason, peace, world unity, etc. and have those who can speak in their name constitute a governing agency to act as check and guide to the governing agency representing the state. The former agency would be a modern rational and ethical equivalent of the church.

* * *

Wednesday, March 22, 1939

The essence of democracy should not be identified either with parliamentarism which happens to be one of the methods of implementing it or with individual freedom, and consent of the governed which are prerequisites to it. The types of parliamentarism that have been tried have failed. This is no reason why other types should not be tried. But democracy as such is a social order which is based on the assumption that justice can be willed and that through willing it, it becomes the

decisive influence in the conflict of human interests. I would define justice practically in the terms used by Plato, namely as that governing principle in human relationships whereby one's duties correspond to one's abilities and one's rights correspond with what one needs to be able to fulfill one's duties. It is necessary to realize that in recognizing this principle as a determining factor or force in human life, we merely articulate in our own fashion which is in keeping with our rational world outlook the principle implied in all religious and ethical systems, viz. that the career of mankind is not determined by the interests which answer to the blind impulses, but by forces which the best way man has been able to dientify has been by calling them invisible. There is an ancestry to the principle of justice as defined above. That ancestry is to be found in the gods, spirits and ancestors who from of old have been the objects of worship.

At the initiative of Buber, Bergmann and Frankel a symposium on educational aims is being organized for Thursday and Friday, May 25-26. They were going to make a big splurge and invite all the educational organizations to take part, which of course would have meant inviting all kinds of political complications. Fortunately they called in Alex Dushkin and me at the initial stage of their ~~xxx~~ planning and we succeeded to hold down the affair to modest proportions. In the program which has finally been agreed upon I shall have to give the opening lecture. Its subject is to be "The Meaning of Nationalism and Its Place in Education."

All education, insofar as it aims to integrate the individual into the group, seeks to generate in the child a we-feeling in reference to his people. This we-feeling should not be identified as due to common ancestry or to unique racial characteristics. Such identification breeds jingoism. It should rather be identified as due to common objects, place persons, etc which serve as sources of value and which give meaning and

direction to one's life -- in other words with the sancta of a people. It is not the fact of common descent that generates attachment between two persons, but the consciousness of some common person or persons as constituting an objective of love that is responsible for such attachment. The sharing of sancta, of values, is the real source of we-feeling. Hence all that speculation about unique qualities or ideals is pure nonsense.

Incidentally, I have learned that Buber apparently drew upon Joseph Salvador for his ideas about the distinctive traits of the Jewish people, namely aspiration to unity and action and faith in the future. Zollschan in "Revision des judischen Nationalismus" deals that theory a shattering blow.

* * *

Friday, March 24, 1939

These days I have again been listening frequently to the radio to learn about the latest development of the international crisis. Typical of the present state of mind is this experience of mine last night: I was writing up the lecture on "The Democratic Ideology" which I am scheduled to give under the auspices of the Friends of the University here on April 12. ~~American~~ Anxious as I was to know the latest news I was afraid to turn on the radio for fear that I might hear bad news and would not be able to go on with the writing of the lecture which I was about to complete. It required quite some exercise of will to allow the minutes when the news was being transmitted to keep myself down to work. At six o'clock this morning I made a dive for the "Palestine Post" which is left early morning in the door handle, to see whether war hasn't been declared yet.

* * *

Saturday, March 25, 1939

I feel as if I have enough to say about "Militant Democracy" to write a book on it. I think that I made note of that title in this Journal some time ago.

I no sooner got through with my lecture on "The Democratic Ideology" than I began workin on the lecture which I am scheduled to give at the educational symposium which is being arranged ~~xk~~ by the University. My subject is "The Meaning of Nationalism and Its Place in Education." So far the following is to be the thought I expect to develop:

It is generally admitted that the aim of education from the standpoint of the social group which conducts it, is to integrate the child into the society into which he was born. That society is not an amorphous mass. It has an inner unity, organization and life of its own and sufficient traits to mark it off from other units of a similar character. In the past that unit might have been a clan, tribe, city-state or nation. In civilized society as it is constituted today, it is a nation. The purpose in integrating the child into the nation is to inculcate in him a we-feeling or we-attitude toward all members of the nation, past, present and future. At once we come upon an important distinction between the elements upon which education has hitherto based and to a large extent still bases its efforts to incluclate the we-attitude from those upon which democratic educations hopes to base its efforts. Traditionally education assumed four factors as constituting nationhood namely: 1. blood kinship; 2. land; 3. culture; 4. self-government. The methods which it has employed to inculcate a we-attitude with regard to these factors have been: 1. training in habits of obedience; and, 2. exalting the value of each of these factors as being of supreme worth to the self-fulfillment of the individual. An additional tract of

traditional education was its assumption of a supernatural sanction for the four factors. Fascism is an attempt to revive the traditional conception of nationality and the traditional method of education. It is the culmination of modern nationalistic trends which have been crystallizing since the last quarter of the 18th century when supernatural sanctions lost their effectiveness. Among those nationalistic trends have been our own which have emphasized the same factors and have resorted to the same type of educational appeal.

In contrast with both the traditional and the fascist conception of nationality and eduation of national we-feeling is the democratic. In the first place, it eliminates blood-kinship as the basis of nationality. The fiction of common ancestry was created in the past to account for collective life and cooperation, because the ancients reasoned by analogy from the family. Objectively, it is not the kinship itself that generates the we-feeling even in the family but the cooperation to which it leads. Nowadays that fiction is deliberately invoked in the face of the most irrefutable facts, in order to foster national solidarity. There remains therefore for democracy the three other factors, viz. land, culture and self-government. In contrast with the traditional and the fascist nationalist approach, democracy would inculcate the we-feeling with regard to them not by representing them as intrinsically of supreme worth, but as of supreme worth only to those born into the nation, as a means of their self-fulfillment. The land can be such as affording security, the culture as affording self-expression, and the institutions of self-government as affording means of self-control. To the extent that these factors fall short of being such, it devolves upon the members of the nation to make them such. Hence the ideal if implicit obedience is out of place in democracy, since it would preclude the improvement in those factors, which is necessary to render them fully effective as a means of salvation to the members of the nation.

At this point it is necessary to illustrate the traditional Jewish teaching with regard to the land of Israel, Jewish culture, viz. the Hebrew Language, the national literature, folkways, etc. and the system of morals and jurisprudence, and to point out what the evaluation of them would be from the democratic standpoint.

* * *

Sunday, March 26, 1939

In a brief discussion I had with Alex Dushkin last night he raised what seemed to me a valid objection against my suggestion of having in the democratic scheme of government one house to represent the interests from an economic standpoint. ie the various economic organizations and corporations, and the other house the ideal interests. He made the point that it is not possible to have representation based on the artificial distinction between the economic and the ethical aspect of the various interests. I naturally could not but agree with him, since I have been all along combating the reification of spiritual values. Yet a way must be found to accentuate them more effectively than is apt to be the case, if there is no agency dedicated specifically to their conservation. On further reflection it occurred to me that just this is the very function of the judicial branch of the government in the American scheme, which has carried out Aristotle's idea in his "Politics." Given a constitution, with the changes which must be effected in the economic order, and a legislature organized on the line suggested by the Webbs, with whatever additions are necessary to overcome the objections in their scheme, a judiciary on the lines of the American Supreme Court would qualify ideally for the task of setting in motion what I term "the invisible forces" implied in the concept of "justice."

This morning I met Prof. Ch. Albeck who said he had been intending to come to see me because he wanted to talk to me about a personal matter. I had him come with me to the house, and he told me of his troubles here. I had known something about them from the discussions concerning him in the "Senat" of the University. The following is what he told me: He came here about three or four years ago with some money which he invested in a house, expecting to be able to live on the income of £35 which it would yield him. Before long the income ceased. But he was saved from anxiety by a two year appointment at the University as Professor ad personam in Halakha and Haggadah. That yielded him an income of £30 monthly. Last summer at the London meeting of the University directors the question of his reappointment had come up and Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz objected strongly to him having been given the subject of Haggadah, which he wanted reserved for Heinemann. As a result Albeck's salary was cut by half. About the third week in October he was informed that beginning with Oct. 1 his salary would be £15 per month. He blames Senator chiefly for this inconsiderate treament of him.

Beginning Thurs. Jan. 19 of this year I have been taking lessons in reading music. My teacher is Mrs. Berlin, who was recommended to me by our neighbor Mrs. Feigenbaum. What I am learning is of little account. The lessons and the occasional preparation for them afford me the only distraction from this insane world. (I understand there is a new book out by the name "Insanity Fair.")

* * *

Monday, March 27, 1939

What a wealth of implications in the following I heard over the radio a few days ago. In Paris the Czech Embassy is draped in black. Inside there is a large book into which passersby are asked to inscribe their names to a protest against Germany's rape of Czecho-Slovakia. The

inscription over the door reads, in the words of Tha: (p.284)

The principle underlying Jewish education in diaspora should be: Jewish in content and universal in intent.

* * *

Tuesday, March 28, 1939

Plato and Aristotle seem to have defined for all time the two poles between which all thinking must move, namely, idealism and pragmatism, Plato having stressed idealsim and Aristotle pragmatism. In politics these two poles of thought are represented respectively by the fascist trend and the democratic trend.

I received a letter from Cyrus Adler yesterday in reply to Shocken's of Jan. 25. Every one of his official letters reminds me of the phrase "he froze to the occasion." Of course he turned down Shocken's suggestion that I should come to the University for the summer semester once in two years. Devoid as he is of imagination, how could he sense the value of a personal contact between the Seminary and the Hebrew University?

Apropos of the habit I cultivated of taking my daily constitutional on the roof instead of walking down King George Rd. through Ben Yehuda down to the Zion Cinema which I used to do formerly, I said to Lena the other day "There's nothing like having a roof under your feet." It was at her suggestion I made the change last August when shootings and bombings in the heart of the new city became rather frequent.

* * *

Wednesday, March 29, 1939

It seems to me that there is considerable identity between the concept of "values" in philosophy and Aristotle's purposive cause, likewise between the latter and the concept of the potential. I find all these concepts helpful in dealing with the problem of nationality. Nationhood represents the purposive cause or potential element of a society whose members have a common past and aspire to a common future, just as ego-hood is the purposive cause of the human individual, and god-hood of the cosmos.

Like all values, nationhood is conceived differently in accordance with the general social and intellectual development of the age. In the past it was conceived as possible only to a group that had a common ancestry. The assumption was that it could be maintained only 1) first by emphasizing the supreme and absolute worth of that ancestry and of everything connected with the life of the particular nationality to which one belonged, especially the land, its culture and its laws, and 2) by insisting upon uniformity in its mode of life and conformity to that mode on the part of every individual. In keeping with the ancient cast of mind both of these objectives implied the assumption that nationhood was supernatural in origin and purpose. An additional element in the traditional conception is self-sufficiency sometimes to the point of complete isolation.

Fascism is a modern adaptation of the traditional approach to nationhood. The only difference is that instead of a supernatural sanction it assumes a transcendental sanction for it.

Thursday, March 30, 1939

In contrast with traditionalism and fascism is the approach of democracy. In the first place it repudiates common ancestry as the basis of nationhood. Secondly it dispenses with the assumption of the absolute and supreme worth of the principal factors in the life of the nation.

Thirdly it would not sacrifice individuality to inner national unity. And fourthly, it would not pace the nation above international law.

It seems to me that it ought to be possible to work up the Supreme Court decisions into educational content for high-school instruction in civics.

* * *

Saturday night, April 1, 1939

Last night we had dinner with the Dushkins. They had also as guests Capt. & Mrs. Wingate and her mother, Mrs. Patterson. Wingate comes from a distinguished English family and belongs to a religious group known, I believe, as the Plymouth Brethren. His mind is completely saturated by the Bible - Old and New Testament - and accepts its interpretation of life as authoritative. Taking that interpretation seriously, he naturally regards the Jewish people as the people of divine destiny with Palestine as the ultimate theatre of its functioning. He spoke in the bitterest and most resentful terms of the attitude of the English officials toward Zionism. He attributes this attitude to their inability to adjust themselves to anything so vital and creative as Zionism. In his opinion if the Arabs had understood their own interests, they would have realized that their freedom could best be defended by the Jews. By Arab freedom, he meant freedom from domination by Germany or Italy. His reason for regarding the Jews as best fitted to secure this freedom for the Arabs is that, on the one hand, the democratic nations cannot afford or do not care to exert sufficient energy for that purpose and, on the other, the Jews being European are far better fitted to develop the necessary military strength and to lay up the necessary military provisions for adequate defense than are the Arabs themselves.

To me the foregoing view sounds fanciful. I believe it is part of his general prejudice in favor of the Jews. Although I had been told about this attitude of his before, I forgot it when I was drawn into a

with him about the Davidic authorship of the Psalms. He strongly upheld that authorship on the ground that the combination of poet and soldier was a frequent one in history. Moreover, he stated that it was his principle that we should accept the teaching of tradition as true, unless we have clear evidence to the contrary. Probably the fact that I had heard this same principle stated several times by Cyrus Adler that made me forget that I was arguing with a kind hearted romantically minded gentile soldier and I tried to make out a case for the non-Davidic authorship of the Psalms. After a while, however, I came to my senses, pulled my punches, and made haste to drop the subject.

What is signficant about him is that last summer when the terror in the country was beginning to get out of control he organized in the Emek small mobile units of Jewish soldiers and with them went to search Arab villages. As a result of the training he gave those soldiers the Jewish settlements in the Emek have been able to ward off terrorist attacks more effectively. The very efficiency, however, of his efforts to put down terrorism led the authorities to transfer him to Jerusalem where he would have less opportunity to be enterprising than in the Emek.

This morning Lena and I joined the Kliglers in their celebration of their son David's bar mitzvah. We went to the Jeshurun synagogue and then we had dinner with them. The Magnes and the Dushkins were their other guests.

This is a case where the bar mitzvah celebration was practically entirely the result of the boy's own wish. The father hasn't been inside a synagogue in years and is strongly prejudiced against traditional religion. But such is the force of the general environment that the boy begged to have the celebration of his bar mitzvah. A similar instance is our neighbor, Mrs. Feigenbaum, a widow, whose two children 10 and 6 respectively enter fully at this time into the spirit of a Pesah, despite

the fact that their mother had been weaned away completely from traditional religion.

A few days ago I received a copy of Prof. Leon Roth's (p.287)

As I turned to the first page I found on it printed the following: I have an idea the initials stand for my name and that the motto refers to the fact that the book is his first attempt of this kind. I cannot account for his referring to me, except that as a result of something I must have said to him about the irrelevance of the ancient philosophers for our day he must have been stung into writing that little book. He did in several of his conversations with me, make some mysterious allusion to my being responsible for something he was doing, but I never understood what he referred to. I was inclined to like him a good deal, but his Oxford manner would always come between us and I never could engage him in an honest-to-goodness mental fisticuffs. I tried several times but had to give it up.

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Sunday, April 2, 1939

My nephew Harold Rubin treated my children to a telephone talk with us from his office in New York. At 7:15 tonight Lena, Naomi and I spoke with them. There was excitement galore. The thrill of it is too much for words.

* * *

Wednesday, April 5, 1939

The paper I read at the gathering under the auspices of the Tel-Aviv Friends of the University appeared as a full length article in the special erev-Pesay number of the Ha-Arez. I am rather satisfied both with its content and its style.

We had a very pleasant Seder at our home on Monday night. We had with us the Dushkins and the Kliglers, Mrs. Feivenbaum, Miss Sylvia Gelber and Manny Dickler, the medical student at the Beirut University where Naomi is now completing her second year.

* * *

Sunday, April 9, 1939

At Dushkins with whom we visited last Friday night the question came up why it is that many English officials who come here with the best of intentions to understand the Zionist movement and to help it along become alienated from it after a while and throw in their sympathies with the Arabs. Judge Khassan of Haifa, Dushkin's brother-in-law, who is a native Palestinian, explained that the change in the attitude of these Englishmen is due to the difference between the treatment they receive at the hands of the Arabs from that at the hands of the Jews. The former are deferent and hospitable. The latter are disputatious and keep aloof. During the Turkish regime Jews were wont to act very deferentially toward the Turkish officials, to invite them to their homes and to send them gifts. With the advent of the English regime, the Arabs act toward the English officials the way the Jews did formerly toward the Turkish officials.

One thing is certain that if Jews had possessed social cleverness they could have made friends of both the Arabs and the English. Instead ~~they~~ those who began coming here after the Balfour declaration regarded the Arabs with contempt and the English as aliens, from whom they wanted to receive no favors so as to be under no obligations to them. Of course it is the unfortunate sense of inferiority which has been beaten into us by the rest of the world that is responsible for our social awkwardness. But here that awkwardness has cost us dearly and our leaders should have had sense enough to insist upon our overcoming it.

After all I have read - and there is really not very much to read - about the question of evil and after all I have pondered on it - and that I have done a good deal, I am as helpless as a babe in coping with the present state of the world. The chief Italian gangster who has been undone by his German understudy is apparently trying to recover his championship. Hence the rape of Albania. The plight of tens of thousands of human beings who have been put to flight from their homes by these two demons, and who are crowded into boats that wander about the seas trying to find a haven for the refugees, cries in vain to heaven no less than to men. So much for the world scene. At the other end of the scale, in point of sphere of influence, is the tragic death of Marvin Lindheim, aged 31. His young wife was burned to death a few months ago in an aeroplane accident. His mother, who is one of the few remarkable American Jewish women working for Jewish life, has been struck by fate one cruel blow after another. I was apprised of this latest tragedy in her life last night as I went over to the Dushkins to meet Miss Henrietta Szold and her two sisters who had come to fetch her back to America. She is 78 and her heart is fast breaking up. With the utmost reluctance she is letting go of one task after another. She is about to make a trip through the country in connection with her work for the Youth Aliyah ~~Fx~~ It is to be her last trip. This combination of large scale human cruelty, meaningless suffering and death due to sheer chance in the lives of so many human beings, and at best the fading out of a well spent heroic life in a blaze of keen self-awareness -- all this is too much for my reeling brain.

Let me try to reason all this out for the ten-thousandth time, though I am sure to land in the same blind alley. If there is no God there surely is no point to all this cruelty and suffering and the sooner life - human life - becomes extinct the better. If there is a God and He permits all this to go on then human beings ought to commit suicide to

prove their moral superiority to Him. It is impossible, however, that these two alternatives should exhaust reality, for the following reason: The very protest at the apparent meaninglessness of life cannot be part of that meaninglessness; it must stand outside of it. That protest moreover proceeds from moral assumptions in the light of which it condemns God for permitting all this evil to go on. Why not rather conclude that God - if He exists - must be inclusive of our highest moral assumptions, cannot He such as to be identified with the God of either of the above alternatives. In other words we cannot help concluding that life has meaning - except that we must readjust our idea of existence as meaningful, and that there is a God - except that we must give up our notion of him as almighty in plan and execution. This is the furthest I ever get.

No small part of my embitterment last night was due also to the effect which the first part of (p.289) had on me. Facts such as those revealed in that book make me terribly conscious of our itrinsic cultural and spiritual impotence as a people. In spite of all wherewith the Goyim have afflicted us without the prodding of their civilizations, we would have sunk into barbarism. We rightly blame the Goyim for isolating us and for the resulting degeneration. But if our culture were intrinsically worth anything, it ought to have been able to ward off that degeneration. I can't forgive our Jewish great men - Maimonides, the Gaon of Wilna, the Besht and others of like repute - for having contributed nothing to make us culturally and spiritually self-sufficient, for having left us on the contrary, bound hand and foot by tradition, so that we have become helpless cripples. Too bad, we had only one Spinoza and that he too preferred to fight from without instead of from within.

There's no denying, however, that there is a certain intrinsic charm to the narrow and self-sufficient world of the Talmudist Jew. In working up the subject of "the daily regimen of the Jew," I made it a point to read the preface to the second edition of Danzig's (p.290)

I was happy to be carried along by the current of his argument in which he tries to justify a codification like his. But then there were the usual jolts at the infantilism of the men of his type, as when I read the following:

* * *

Monday, April 10, 1939

I have just come from the Jeshurun synagogue. The services were well attended, probably due to the Yizkor part. I think our national stupidity never stands out so sharply as at our religious services. Such an indiscriminate collection of prayers and readings, such infinite repetion, such complete disregard of vital realities and needs at a time when people are ready to give expression to their deepest feelings are entirely unforgivable. Take, for example, the Yizkot part. If we do think it important to remember the departed in the course of public services, we ought to have some prayers or readings that would articulate that importance. Instead all that our great sages and poets could formulate for us is that vulgar promise to pay a couple of shillings - a sort of bribe to the Almighty, he shouldn't be so hard on our poor relatives. After the congregation stands on its feet a long time not knowing what to do after it has recited that promise, the cantor breaks out with a great lament, which after a while turns out to be a memorial prayer for somebody's great grandfather or some such individual. In the meantime the entire congregation stands on their feet

swaying to the xxxxxxx sad tune. When the cantor is through, he starts all over again with a slight variant of the same tune. When he comes to mention the person for whom the prayer is intended it turns out to be the entire host of victims of the terrorist campaign in the country. The congregation keep on swaying with not the slightest indication that the tragic actualities of life invaded the services for a fleeting moment. This is followed by the cantor giving the signal for the congregation to mill through that horrible concoction of verses beginning with the phrase Father of mercies. Could anything appear more bizarre, if we only stopped to consider?

My Naomi spent last Thursday at Mismar Haemek and Friday and Saturday at Ea Hashophat. She tells me that they eat leavened bread there during the Passover, although they also have mazzot and celebrated Seder night. It is only the third year since they've started having Seder at Mishmar. There is no question that Jewish life is bound to evolve here its appropriate religious expression. But what I marvel at is the success with which both the pietists and the radicals -- or is it only the radicals? -- are managing to sidestep a klulturkampf.

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Thursday, April 13, 1939

Last night I delivered a lecture on (p.291)
under the auspices of the There was a very small audience. The secretary ascribed the poor attendance to the two large affairs that were going on at the same time a Habimah play and a Sargent concert. I really didn't care whether the audience was large or small. Under present conditions such matters are too trivial to be discussed.

Yesterday I received a letter from Solomon Goldman dated March 31. Among other things he says that he regrets that I am not remaining in Palestine. There is an unreality about our efforts here that makes all of our work futile. In some of the letters I received from Ira Eisenstein last year he sounded the same note. If that is the way the sincere rabbi feels, why should the average layman be expected to be interested in Judaism?

In reply to my letter of Feb. 24 to A. T. Thomson, then chairman of the SAJ Board, in which I asked him to present my request to the Board to appoint me Emeritus, I received a letter from him dated March 29 in which he says that he did not present my request to the Board. "The first and foremost prerequisite to get our people interested from a financial standpoint was my assurance to them that at the expiration of your leave of absence you would come back and assume your post with us as in the past."

* * *

Saturday night, April 15, 1939

Just heard over the radio about Roosevelt's cable to Hitler and Mussolini urging them to promise they won't attack any of the thirty nations he enumerated and pleading for a world disarmament conference. I feel like uttering the benediction .

* * *

Saturday, April 22, 1939

At Lena's suggestion a local bookbinder (a doctor juris) has been working on an extra fine binding for my copies of Judaism as a Civilization and my two other books. The other day his wife brought me the bound copies, and I refused to accept them because he stamped my name on top of the back and the title of the book at the bottom. His wife said that he has been accustomed to do it that way right along. It then

occurred to me that the Germans probably have all their books bound that way -- the author's name first and then the name of the book. I took a look at the books in my library and sure enough every German book is bound that way, while on every English book the author's name is second. I believe that a national difference of this kind has psychological significance and confirms the general impression that egotism is a German characteristic. It is interesting, incidentally, that the Hebrew books follow the German practice; this should be of sociological significance, indicating the predominance of German influence on Jewish life.

A terse way of expressing the difference between town life and village life in the Yishub here is the one I heard last night from two young people from Ain Hashofet. The English soldiers who do military duty in the Jewish villages become Zionists, whereas those who do military duty in the towns become anti-Semites.

* * *

Sunday, April 23, 1939

This afternoon I had two interesting callers. The first was Dr. Rosenberg formerly rabbi of Worms and now of a liberal German congregation in Tel Aviv. He is a young man - about 32 - and son-in-law of Ismar Ellbogen. He was originally associated with Dr. Wilhelm who is heading the (p.292) congregation here and another rabbi of the same type in Haifa. (These three congregations are receiving support from the "World Union for Progressive Judaism.") But when he saw that the other two rabbis were catering to the Orthodox element and doing nothing that indicated that they meant to reckon with the fundamental problems of Jewish religion, he resolved to work by himself. In Tel-Aviv he has met with strong opposition from Rabbi Amiel, who has denounced his experiment and deprived him of the right to officiate at weddings, etc. He has to depend mainly upon private lessons as a source of livelihood.

He was moved to come to see me by my article on (p.292) in the Erev Pesah number of the Ha Aretz. He wanted me to advise him how to find a group of people who could help him with his undertaking. There was nothing I could say to him on that score. It seems that life here is no less strenuous than, say, in America, and people feel they can be Jews without troubling about any of the basic problems of Judaism. He then wanted to get my idea concerning the conception of God. He was apparently not satisfied by what I said because he remarked afterwards that he considered the belief in supernatural revelation of God as a historic event which took place at Sinai, as indispensable to Jewish religion.

Then came Ruffin. He is at work at present on a volume dealing with the future of the Jewish people. As a sociologist he is interested in the part played by religion as a conserving factor in Jewish life of the past. He wonders how Jews could survive as a people with that factor's ceasing to operate. I tried to explain to him that the generally accepted view that religion was a conserving factor in Jewish life is not altogether in keeping with the facts. In the past when every group expressed its individuality in mythological and theurgic terms, the Jews could not do otherwise than articulate their individuality in similar terms. To do so at present, however, would be fatal, because they would thereby place themselves out of gear with the rest of the world's tendencies and strivings. Every modern nation is evolving a philosophy of life which, while expressing its individuality, is based on realities and needs as the modern man sees them. The Jews must do the same, if they are to survive as a nation.

He countered by saying that all this may sound plausible to both of us who view the problem academically. But how about the masses who cling to the traditional mythologies and theurgy? My reply was that we should not expect the majority to adopt the more enlightened view of

religion. It is sufficient that a considerable minority come to accept the more advanced ideas, because what is mainly important for a nation is that it retain its hold on the more capable and highly developed intellectually and spiritually. If Jewish religion will fail to develop in conformity with the modern outlook on life, the Jewish people will lose its most worthwhile men and women and deteriorate as a nation.

Today there appeared in the (p.293) an article by entitled in which he takes issue with my article of Erev Pesah. He deprecates the appeal to reason.

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Thursday, April 27, 1939

A special pedagogic committee was appointed by the University Senate a long time ago to work out a list of recommendations of subjects to be chosen by students who want to qualify as teachers in secondary schools here. Ordinarily a matter like that is worked out between one who is in charge of the pedagogy courses and the registrar. The University Senate, however, being run on "democratic" lines appointed a committee of five for the Humanities Faculty and a similar committee for the Science Faculty. I don't know what the committee for the Science Faculty has been doing. I know that our committee met three times about 2 to 3 hours each time, and finally formulated a list of combinations of subjects. The recommendation of the committee came up before the Humanities Faculty at the meeting ~~of~~ yesterday afternoon and for two-and-a-half hours discussed them in a way that indicated on the part of most of the debaters little understanding of what they were talking about. Most of them argued as if the committee had actually suggested the transformation of the courses in a way they really should be transformed, if the University ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ intends to train teachers. Neither-Yellin

nor Sukenick showed much sense and as for Klausner, he always shoots wide of the mark. Torczyner always talks as if he had a chip on his shoulder. Sholem - though a kabbalist - seems to be about the only one who thinks and to express himself clearly. Alex, who reported for the committee and who answered the various objections, was swell.

One thing, however, Klausner said is worth recording. He said about the University students: (p.294) [illegible]

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Saturday night, May 6, 1939

I learned last night that Litvinoff, who has recently had to resign his post as Foreign Secretary of Russia, was the one who coined the phrase "Peace is indivisible" which implies that peace cannot be secured unless those countries which really want peace cooperate with that end in view. It occurred to me this morning that the conception of God as one and indivisible might likewise be interpreted as in physics that ideals like freedom, justice, peace, love which in their totality are symbolized by the God conception cannot be achieved if applied only partially. Lincoln's statement, for example, that America cannot be a nation half free and half slave, carries out the same idea. Monotheism therefore in addition to voicing the aspiration for a united mankind, also reflects the will to have all mankind benefit alike by ~~e~~ from the ethical ideals identified with the God concept.

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Friday, May 12, 1939

The educational symposium, of which Buber and Frankel were the initiators, and on which the arrangements committee spent a lot of time, has been called off. I was to have spoken on the subject [illegible] I spent almost two weeks, I think, on the paper which is practically finished. The outsiders who had been invited to participate, with the